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[A] correct understanding of a matter and a 
misunderstanding of the same matter are not mutually 
exclusive.1  
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1
 FRANZ KAFKA, THE TRIAL 122 (DER PROZESS) (David Wyllie trans., Dover Thrift Editions 
ed. 2009) (1925) (detailing a surreal account of an ordinary person’s prosecution by a 
mindless and incomprehensible legal system); see infra note 241, Mem. Decision on Action 
for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief at 19; In re PG&E Corp., 603 B.R. 471, 484 (Bankr. 
N.D. Cal. 2019) (“Imagine the absurdity of the exclusive appeal route espoused by FERC . 
. . . Kafka might have designed it[.]”).   
1
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Wildfires have ravaged California in recent years. In 2018, blazes 
across the state killed eighty-six people and caused more than $9 billion in 
property damage.2 The year before, in 2017, wildfires killed forty people 
and caused at least $10 billion in property damage.3 California’s inverse 
condemnation law holds Pacific Gas & Electric Company (PG&E), the 
state’s largest gas and electric utility, liable for much of the damage.4 Yet, 
California’s adverse regulatory environment makes cost recovery from 
customers unlikely.5 As a result, PG&E, along with its parent company, filed 
for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in January 2019 for debts anticipated to exceed 
$51 billion.6 Fire victims and shareholders, however, are not the only ones 
who could suffer. At the time of filing bankruptcy, PG&E had more than 
380 long-term contracts with independent power producers worth $42 
billion.7 Under Chapter 11, PG&E could “reject” any of these contracts as 
part of its bankruptcy, leaving its suppliers with unsecured claims.8 This 
                                                                    
2
 Andrew Scheeler, These Three 2018 California Wildfires Caused More Than $9 Billion 
in Damage, SACRAMENTO BEE (Dec. 12, 2018), https://www.sacbee.com/news/politics-
government/capitol-alert/article222997430.html [https://perma.cc/KCC8-H3NJ]. 
3
 See Rong-Gong Lin II & Paige St. John, From Extreme Drought to Record Rain: Why 
California’s Drought-to-Deluge Cycle Is Getting Worse, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 12, 2017), 
https://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-record-rains-20170410-story.html 
[https://perma.cc/UQ4X-ANUK]; Lauren Tierney, The Grim Scope of 2017’s California 




 Zach Wichter, California’s Largest Utility Says It Is Bankrupt. Here’s What You Need to 
Know., N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 29, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/29/business/pge-
bankruptcy.html [https://perma.cc/P4JB-KU3S]. 
5
 Hudson Sangree, California Wildfire Bill Goes to Governor, RTO INSIDER (Sept. 1, 2018), 
https://www.rtoinsider.com/california-sb-901-wildfire-jerry-brown-99037/ 
[https://perma.cc/YJ22-BSVV] (leaving California’s doctrine of inverse condemnation that 
“holds utilities strictly liable for fire damage” undisturbed and providing only one-time relief 
to utilities).  
6
 PG&E’s Voluntary Pet. for Non-Individuals Filing for Bankruptcy at 5, In re PG&E Corp. 
and Pac. Gas and Elec. Co., No. 19-30088 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 2019). 
7
 Gavin Blade, FERC Reasserts Authority Over PG&E Contracts in Bankruptcy Court Filing, 




 PG&E recently expressed its commitment to retain these contracts, despite suggestions that 
the company “likely would reject some of its legacy renewable energy contracts signed at 
above-market prices.” Garrett Hering, PG&E Provides Glimpse of Restructuring Plan, 
Keeping All Energy Contracts, S&P GLOBAL MARKET INTELLIGENCE (Aug. 7, 2019), 
https://www.spglobal.com/marketintelligence/en/news-insights/trending/FVFVuk6ctyU-
2
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concern is not hypothetical. In fact, some PG&E suppliers saw their credit 
ratings reduced to “junk status” in anticipation that their long-term contracts 
could be discarded during bankruptcy.9  
To avoid that outcome, NextEra Energy (NextEra), one of PG&E’s 
contract suppliers, petitioned the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 
(FERC or Commission) to order PG&E to obtain Commission approval 
prior to rejecting any wholesale power purchase agreements.10 Both PG&E 
and the Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of California assert that 
the bankruptcy court has exclusive jurisdiction over the matter.11 FERC, on 
the other hand, has argued it retains concurrent or exclusive jurisdiction 
over the contracts.12 This dispute is the focus of this article; namely, whether 
FERC can exercise jurisdiction over wholesale power purchase contracts 
when a public utility or independent power producer declares bankruptcy. 
This article argues that FERC has exclusive jurisdiction over wholesale 
power purchase contracts because Congress intended for the Commission, 
pursuant to the Federal Power Act (FPA), to exercise plenary authority over 
interstate energy markets. Moreover, Mission Product Holdings Inc. v. 
Tempnology, LLC suggests the Bankruptcy Code should not be read to the 
exclusion of other fonts of federal law. This article also argues that to the 
extent federal courts fail to respect FERC’s exercise of jurisdiction, Congress 
should enact legislation that clearly demarcates the boundaries between the 
Federal Power Act and the Bankruptcy Code.  
                                                                    
Me_dZIGOtA2 [https://perma.cc/W3QZ-AYNT]. Regardless of the outcome in PG&E’s 
case, this issue will likely remain relevant as climate change increases the frequency and 
severity of adverse weather events. The Wall Street Journal, among others, has described 
PG&E’s predicament as “the first climate-change bankruptcy” though “probably not the last.” 
Russell Gold, PG&E: The First Climate-Change Bankruptcy, Probably Not the Last, WALL 
ST. J. (Jan. 18, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/pg-e-wildfires-and-the-first-climate-
change-bankruptcy-11547820006 [https://perma.cc/R6M7-9HQT] (“PG&E Corp.’s 
bankruptcy could mark a business milestone: the first major corporate casualty of climate 
change. Few people expect it will be the last.”).  
9
 Jeffrey Ryser, Topaz Solar, A Top Power Supplier to PG&E, Downgraded to Junk, S&P 




 Pet. for Declaratory Order & Compl. ¶ 61,049, NextEra Energy, Inc. v. Pac. Gas & Elec. 
Co., 166 FERC (Jan. 18, 2019) (No. EL19-35-000). 
11
 In re PG&E Corp., 603 B.R. 471, 479 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2019). 
12
 NextEra Energy, Inc. v. Pac. Gas & Elec., 166 FERC ¶ 61,049 (Jan. 25, 2019); Br. for 
Appellant FERC at 38, In re PG&E Corp., Nos. 19-16833, 19-16834 (9th Cir. Nov. 20, 2019) 
(“The Federal Power Act gives the Commission exclusive authority to regulate the sale of 
[electric] energy at wholesale in interstate commerce[.]” (citing 16 U.S.C. §§824(a), 824d(a))). 
3
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Ultimately, the preservation of FERC authority is important to ensure 
uniform interpretation of FPA jurisdictional contracts and, conversely, to 
avoid the risks associated with bankruptcy courts across the country 
exclusively rendering judgment without reference to the Federal Power Act. 
The ex post elimination of FERC jurisdiction would allow defaulting parties, 
with the assistance of the bankruptcy courts, to engage in unanticipated risk 
allocation shifting. Although the practical consequences are uncertain, the 
possibility of risk shifting could hinder the further decline of renewable 
energy prices by injecting fresh uncertainty into capital investment decision 
making.13 In turn, higher costs and greater market uncertainty presumably 
would disincentivize investment at a time when many states and public 
utilities are relying on independent power producers to help achieve 
renewable energy mandates.  
In order to provide a framework for these arguments, this article first 
provides a brief overview of the Bankruptcy Code, the Federal Power Act, 
and wholesale energy markets.14 Second, this article discusses the filed rate 
and Mobile-Sierra doctrines that inform the scope of FERC’s jurisdiction.15 
Third, this article reviews prior cases involving disputes between FERC and 
bankruptcy courts.16 Fourth, this article explains why FERC may exercise 
exclusive jurisdiction and why the Supreme Court’s holdings in NextWave 
and Bildisco provide little guidance for resolving jurisdictional disputes 
between FERC and the bankruptcy courts.17 Finally, this article concludes 
that exclusive FERC jurisdiction over wholesale power purchase contracts 
is warranted as both a matter of law and policy.18 
II. THE BANKRUPTCY CODE, FEDERAL POWER ACT, AND ENERGY 
MARKETS 
This section is intended to provide a brief outline of the Bankruptcy 
Code and the Federal Power Act. These federal statutory schemes 
respectively grant the bankruptcy courts and FERC jurisdiction over their 
relevant subject matters. Additionally, this section gives an overview of 
wholesale energy markets. 
                                                                    
13
 HJ Mai, Renewable Energy Prices Keep Falling: When Do They Bottom Out?, UTILITY 
DIVE (May 30, 2019), https://www.utilitydive.com/news/renewable-energy-prices-keep-
falling-when-do-they-bottom-out/555822/ [https://perma.cc/3G3T-K2LX]. 
14
 Infra Part II. 
15
 Infra Part III. 
16
 Infra Part IV. 
17
 Infra Part V. 
18
 Infra Part VI. 
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A. The Bankruptcy Code 
The Bankruptcy Code is broad in its scope. The Supreme Court has 
explained, “Congress intended to grant comprehensive jurisdiction to the 
bankruptcy courts so that they might deal efficiently and expeditiously with 
all matters connected with the bankruptcy estate.”19 To that end, the Code 
grants district courts exclusive jurisdiction over “all the property, wherever 
located, of the debtor as of the commencement of . . . [a bankruptcy] case, 
and of property of the estate.”20 It also provides the district court original, 
albeit not exclusive, jurisdiction over civil proceedings arising under Chapter 
11.21 However, this conferral of jurisdiction does not preclude an agency 
from commencing or continuing a proceeding to enforce its regulatory 
power.22  
Most relevant to this article is the Chapter 11 business reorganization. 
Chapter 11’s ultimate purpose “is to permit successful rehabilitation of 
debtors.”23 It allows the debtor to serve as a “debtor-in-possession” and act 
as a bankruptcy estate’s trustee.24 Chapter 11 directs the trustee to formulate 
a “plan,” that is, a blueprint for how creditors will be paid.25 As part of a 
reorganization, section 365(a) allows the debtor to reject “all executory 
contracts,” meaning contracts that have not yet been fully performed, 
“except those expressly exempted,”26 subject to approval by the bankruptcy 
court.27 It also is important to note that Chapter 11 plans divide creditors 
into various “classes” that provide for when and how the creditors will be 
                                                                    
19
 Celotex v. Edwards, 514 U.S. 300, 308 (1995) (quoting Pacor, Inc. v. Higgins, 43 F.2d 984, 
994 (3d Cir. 1984)). 
20
 28 U.S.C. § 1334(e)(1) (2017). 
21
 Id. § 1334(b).  
22
 See 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4) (2018); see also Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys. v. MCorp 
Fin., Inc., 502 U.S. 32, 39–40 (1991).  
23
 N.L.R.B. v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 527 (1984).  
24
 See JOAN N. FEENEY ET AL., Bankruptcy Law Manual § 11:8 (5th ed. 2019) (“The debtor 
in possession has the power to operate the debtor’s business with the protection of the 
automatic stay without a court order, has the powers given to a trustee, including avoidance 
powers and rejection of burdensome executory contracts, and is obligated to perform the 
functions and duties of a trustee.”). 
25
 See WILLIAM L. NORTON, JR. & WILLIAM L. NORTON III, Norton Bankr. L. & Prac. 3d 
§ 3:14 (2019) (“[T]he ultimate objective of the debtor in a Chapter 11 case is to have the 
court confirm the plan of reorganization it proposes . . . . The plan of reorganization becomes 
the contract between the debtor and its creditors in respect of all obligations the debtor has 
as of the date of confirmation . . . . [T]herefore, [it] will subsume those terms and conditions 
which allows for a return to prepetition terms and conditions.”). 
26
 Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. at 521.  
27
 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (2018). 
5
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paid.28 While Chapter 11 bankruptcy entails other complexities, the bottom 
line, for the purposes of this article, is that a debtor may discard contracts 
and the bankruptcy estate creditor may only receive a fraction of the contract 
value following rejection.29 
The final Bankruptcy Code provision that warrants consideration is 
the automatic stay under section 362(a).30 The automatic stay stops all 
collection efforts against a debtor once the debtor files a bankruptcy 
petition.31 The stay, with exceptions not relevant to this article,32 applies to 
“[a]ny postpetition act to collect a prepetition claim . . . whether the act is 
direct against the debtor, property of the debtor, or property of the estate.”33 
The stay, however, is not invincible. It does not apply to governmental 
entities enacting or continuing enforcement actions under their regulatory 
authority.34 
                                                                    
28
 See FEENEY ET AL., supra note 24, at § 11:48 (“A plan must designate classes of claims and 
interests . . . . Claims and interests are separated into different classes depending on their 
legal characteristics. Classification must be based on the nature of the claims or interests and 
the members of each class must have claims or interests that are substantially similar to the 
others in that class so that voting on the plan will be representative.”). 
29
 Mission Prod. Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology, LLC, 139 S. Ct. 1652, 1658 (2019) (“Section 
365(g) places that party in the same boat as the debtor’s unsecured creditors, who in a typical 
bankruptcy may receive only cents on the dollar.”). According to a study published by the 
American Banking Institute, “[f]or businesses with assets above $5 million, unsecured 
creditors typically collect half of what they are owed. Where the business’s assets are worth 
less than $200,000, ordinary general creditors usually recover nothing.” Douglas Baird et al., 
The Dynamics of Large and Small Chapter 11 Cases: An Empirical Study 1 (Nov. 2005), 
http://commission.abi.org/sites/default/files/priority.pdf [https://perma.cc/5279-EEZL]. 
30
 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (2018). 
31
 See id.; FEENEY ET AL., supra note 24, at § 11:33 (“An important benefit that a Chapter 11 
debtor receives upon the filing of the petition is the automatic stay . . . . The purposes of the 
automatic stay are to: 1) prevent harassment and the financial pressures of indebtedness; 2) 
avoid the dissipation of assets and interference with the estate; and 3) ensure that similarly 
situated creditors are treated equally.”); Citizens Bank of Md. v. Strumpf, 516 U.S. 16, 17 
(1995) (“Under 11 U.S.C. § 362(a), [the debtor’s] bankruptcy filing gave rise to an automatic 
stay of various types of activity by his creditors.”). 
32
 See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(2)(ii) (allowing the post-petition collection of spousal and child 
support); 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(3) (authorizing the filing of a U.C.C. article 9 continuation 
statement for a secured creditor to maintain perfection of a security interest). 
33
 STEPHEN L. SEPINUCK & GREGORY M. DUHL, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS ON 
BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE 272 (3d ed. 2017) (emphasis omitted); see 11 U.S.C. §§ 
362(a)(1)–(7).  
34
 See 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4); see also Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys. v. MCorp Fin., 
Inc., 502 U.S. 32, 39–40 (1991). 
6
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B. The Federal Power Act 
The Federal Power Act provides the competing body of law at the 
heart of the jurisdictional conflict between FERC and the bankruptcy courts. 
The FPA’s origins provide some insight into FERC’s broad authority in the 
context of wholesale power purchase contracts. Electric service initially was 
a local affair with generation facilities serving customers in their immediate 
vicinity.35 As a result, state and municipal governments took a leading role in 
regulating the nascent industry. Local regulation eventually experienced 
challenges as transmission systems matured and urban development 
brought previously distinct communities—particularly in the northeastern 
United States—into contact with each other.36 These changes meant that a 
utility based and regulated in one state could sell its electricity to a second 
state that lacked the authority to regulate its prices.37  
In 1927, the issue reached the Supreme Court in Public Utilities 
Commission v. Attleboro Steam & Electric Co.38 A decade earlier, Rhode 
Island-based Narragansett Electric Lighting Company (Narragansett) 
entered into a twenty-year contract to provide Massachusetts-based 
Attleboro Steam & Electric Company (Attleboro) with “all the electricity 
required by the Attleboro Company . . . at a specified basic rate.”39 
Narragansett filed with Rhode Island regulators “a schedule setting out the 
rate and general terms of the contract and was authorized . . . to grant the 
Attleboro Company the special rate.”40 However, by 1924, Narragansett 
became dissatisfied with the rate and successfully secured approval from 
Rhode Island to increase it.41 Understandably, Attleboro was unhappy with 
the new arrangement and challenged the authority of Rhode Island 
regulators to dictate prices of electricity transmitted in interstate commerce.42  
                                                                    
35
 New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1 (2002) (“When the Federal Power Act (FPA) became law 
in 1935, most electric utilities operated as separate, local monopolies subject to state or local 
regulation . . . there was little competition among utility companies.”). 
36
 Sam Kalen, Muddling Through Modern Energy Policy: The Dormant Commerce Clause 
and Unmasking the Illusion of an Attleboro Line, 24 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L. J. 283, 291–92 
(2017) (describing how electrical grids expanded from urban centers into surrounding areas 
and nearby states). 
37
 Jim Rossi, The Brave New Path of Energy Federalism, 95 TEX. L. REV. 399, 408–409 
(2016). 
38
 Pub. Util. Comm’n v. Attleboro Steam & Elec. Co., 273 U.S. 83 (1927), abrogated by 
Arkansas Elec. Coop. Corp. v. Ark. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 375 (1983). 
39
 Id. at 84. 
40
 Id. at 84–85. 
41
 Id. at 85. 
42
 Id. at 86. 
7
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Ultimately, the Supreme Court agreed with Attleboro.43 The Court 
held, “[t]he transmission of electric current from one state to another . . . is 
interstate commerce.”44 The Court explained, “‘the commerce clause . . . 
restrains the states from imposing direct burdens upon interstate 
commerce,’ and a state enactment imposing such a ‘direct burden’ must 
fall.’”45 However, there was a catch: “[t]he forwarding state obviously has no 
more authority than the receiving state to place a direct burden upon 
interstate commerce.”46 Thus, a regulatory gap was created that neither state 
could fill. 
Congress eventually passed the Federal Power Act of 1935 to fill the 
“Attleboro gap.”47 However, the FPA does more than fill space created by 
Attleboro. The FPA extends FERC jurisdiction beyond interstate 
transmission (the issue in Attleboro) to all wholesale contracts.48 To that end, 
section 201 of the FPA grants “[t]he Commission . . . jurisdiction over all 
facilities for such transmission or sale of electric energy” at wholesale in 
interstate commerce.49 Section 203 provides that FERC must approve a 
proposed disposition if it finds that the disposition “will be consistent with 
the public interest.”50 Moreover, Congress directed the Federal Power 
Commission (FERC’s predecessor) in section 205 to ensure “[a]ll rates and 
charges made, demanded, or received . . . in connection with the 
transmission or sale of electric energy subject to the jurisdiction of the 
Commission . . . be just and reasonable.”51 Additionally, in section 206, 
Congress gave the Federal Power Commission authority to revise contracts 
“[w]henever the Commission . . . [finds] that any rate . . . or contract affecting 
such rate . . . is unjust, unreasonable, unduly discriminatory or 
preferential[.]”52 As the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals explained, “the Act . 
. . entrusts a broad subject-matter to administration by the Commission, 




 Id.  
45
 Id. at 88 (quoting Minnesota Rates Cases, 230 U.S. 352, 396 (1913)). 
46
 Id. at 90. 
47
 16 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1) (2018); see Rossi, supra note 37 at 409 (explaining that the “Attleboro 
gap” is “a regulatory void where neither the forwarding state nor the receiving state could 
regulate the pricing of electricity sold across state lines.”). 
48
 New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1, 17 (2002) (“There is no language in the statute limiting 
FERC’s transmission jurisdiction to the wholesale market, although the statute does limit 
FERC’s sale jurisdiction to that at wholesale.”). 
49
 16 U.S.C. § 824(b). 
50
 16 U.S.C. § 824b(a)(4) (2018). 
51
 16 U.S.C. § 824d(a) (2018). 
52
 16 U.S.C. § 824e(a) (2018). 
8
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subject to Congressional oversight,” to achieve Congress’ policy objectives.53 
The Supreme Court has similarly interpreted the FPA to eliminate any 
question regarding FERC’s primacy with regards to wholesale energy in 
interstate commerce. Indeed, the Court has repeatedly held that FERC “has 
exclusive authority to regulate ‘the sale of electric energy at wholesale in 
interstate commerce.’”54 
C. Wholesale Energy Markets 
Traditionally, the Attleboro example aside, electric utilities owned and 
operated all of the facilities they needed to generate, transmit, and distribute 
electricity to retail customers. However, in response to a series of energy 
shortages in the 1970s, Congress enacted the Public Utility Regulatory 
Policies Act (PURPA) of 1978 to spur the development of new generation 
facilities.55 PURPA section 210 directs FERC to adopt rules requiring 
electric utilities to: “(1) sell electric energy to qualifying cogeneration 
facilities and qualifying small power production facilities and (2) purchase 
electric energy from such facilities.”56 FERC subsequently adopted rules that 
require electric utilities to purchase “any energy and capacity which is made 
                                                                    
53
 Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 379 F.2d 153, 158–59 (D.C. Cir. 
1967) (“[T]he breadth of agency discretion is, if anything, at zenith when the action assailed 
relates primarily not to the issue of ascertaining whether conduct violates the statute, or 
regulations, but rather to the fashioning of policies, remedies and sanctions . . . in order to 
arrive at maximum effectuation of Congressional objectives.”). 
54
 Hughes v. Talen Energy Mktg., LLC, 136 S. Ct. 1288, 1292 (2016) (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 
824(b)(1) (2015)); Nantahala Power & Light Co. v. Thornburg, 476 U.S. 953, 966 (1986) 
(“FERC clearly has exclusive jurisdiction over the rates to be charged Nantahala’s interstate 
wholesale customers.”); New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1, 22 (2002) (explaining that “the FPA 
contains such ‘a clear and specific grant of jurisdiction’ to FERC over interstate 
transmissions” that a mere policy declaration cannot nullify it) (quoting Fed. Power Comm’n 
v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 376 U.S. 205, 215 (1964)); FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 136 S. 
Ct. 760, 776 (2016) (“[A] FERC regulation does not run afoul of [the Federal Power Act] 
just because it affects—even substantially—the quantity or terms of retail sales. It is a fact of 
economic life that the wholesale and retail markets in electricity, as in every other known 
product, are not hermetically sealed from each other.”). 
55
 Public Utility Regulatory Policy Act (PURPA), UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS (July 
15, 2002), https://www.ucsusa.org/clean_energy/smart-energy-solutions/strengthen-
policy/public-utility-regulatory.html [https://perma.cc/UM9Q-KHK5] (“The Public Utility 
Regulatory Policy Act (PURPA) was passed in 1978, in the midst of the energy crises that 
ripped through industrial world economies. Faced with predictions that the price of oil would 
rise to $100 a barrel, Congress acted to reduce dependence on foreign oil, to promote 
alternative energy sources and energy efficiency, and to diversify the electric power 
industry.”). 
56
 16 U.S.C. § 824a–3(a) (2018). 
9
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available from a qualifying facility” that is listed at a certain price.57 This price 
is known as the “avoided costs” rate.58 The avoided costs rate is a rate not 
exceeding the incremental cost that the utility would incur by generating the 
next unit of energy or capacity itself or purchasing it from another source.59 
Thus, under PURPA as originally enacted, an independent power producer 
could construct a generation facility and require an electric utility to enter a 
wholesale contract to purchase the electricity, assuming the price does not 
exceed the avoided cost rate and the new facility meets PURPA’s Qualifying 
Facility (QF) requirements. 
Wholesale power purchase contracts may include a variety of 
provisions intended to address matters beyond price. These agreements 
often address issues including performance standards for construction; 
commercial operation deadlines; allocation of the risk of loss during 
transmission to a delivery point; reliability and technical standards; the 
issues of curtailment, excess capacity, and output guarantees; limitation of 
the remedies available following a default; allocation of taxes and other 
expenses; and which party will receive benefits, such as renewable energy 
production credits, air-quality and emissions-reduction credits, offsets, and 
allowances.60 Even within the price or quantity provisions, wholesale power 
purchase contracts may not employ flat-rate or per capita terms. Instead, 
prices and quantities may be intended to float based on factors such as time 
of day, time of year, forecasted or real-time market demand, or capacity.61 
                                                                    
57
 18 C.F.R. § 292.303 (2019). 
58
 18 C.F.R. § 292.101(b)(6) (2019). Economic theory suggests that “[a] firm desiring to 
maximize its profits will . . . determine its level of output by continuing production until the 
cost of the last additional unit produced (marginal cost) just equals the addition to revenue 
(marginal revenue) obtained from it.” Cost, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA (Jun. 18, 2008), 
https://www.britannica.com/topic/cost [https://perma.cc/NYR4-YXZM]. The avoided cost 
rate is intended to spur additional capacity development by requiring utilities to purchase 
energy from independent producers when the contract price is below the amount at which 
the marginal cost and revenue intersect. 
59
 18 C.F.R. § 292.101(b)(6) (2019). 
60
 See, e.g., Power Purchase Agreement for the Purchase of Renewable Energy, GOLDEN 
SPREAD ELEC. COOP. (last visited Sept. 4, 2019), https://www.gsec.coop/getmedia/08b27ad0-
534d-4a7c-b8be-80843f8dba57/ERCOT-QF-PPA.aspx [https://perma.cc/TEA5-AJV6]; 




Model Wind Energy Purchase Agreement, XCEL ENERGY (last visited Sept. 4, 2019), 
https://www.xcelenergy.com/staticfiles/xe/Corporate/Corporate%20PDFs/Model_Power_P
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Overall, PURPA had the desired effect.62 Independent power 
producers have added more than 1.4 billion megawatt hours in generation 
capacity, approximately a 4500% increase, since 1990.63 In particular, for 
renewables, PURPA helped spur independent power producers to add 263 
million megawatt hours of wind and solar generation capacity, an 
approximately 8300% increase, during the same time period.64 These are 
significant developments—one megawatt is sufficient to power 
approximately 750 to 1000 average American homes.65 These figures 
                                                                    
62
 In addition to PURPA, wholesale energy market development was fostered by the passage 
of the Energy Policy Act of 1992. Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102–486, 106 Stat. 
2776. Section 721 granted FERC authority to require wholesale market participants to 
provide transmission services when it would be consistent with the Federal Power Act and 
the public interest. Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102–486, title VII, § 721. In 
addition, the legislation took steps to eliminate regulatory barriers to greater wholesale 
competition. Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102–486, § 721 (abolishing the Federal 
Power Act, § 211(c)(1)). Subsequently, in the mid-to-late 1990s, FERC issued a series of 
orders, most notably Order No. 888 and Order No. 2000, which were intended to improve 
competition through improved transmission facility access. FERC Order No. 888, 18 C.F.R. 
§§ 35, 385, 75 FERC ¶ 61,080 (1996) (promoting wholesale competition through open 
access non-discriminatory transmission services by public utilities and recovery of stranded 
costs by public utilities); FERC Order No. 2000, 18 C.F.R. § 35, 89 FERC ¶ 61,285 (1999) 
(requiring that public utilities that own, operate, or control facilities for the transmission of 
electric energy in interstate commerce make certain filings with respect to forming and 
participating in a regional transmission organization). Then again, after the enactment of the 
Energy Policy Act of 2005, FERC issued Orders No. 681, 679, and 890, which further 
reformed transmission service regulations to support wholesale market competition. Energy 
Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109–58 § 1231; FERC Order No. 681, 18 C.F.R. § 42, 116 
FERC ¶ 61,077 (2006) (requiring transmission organizations that are public utilities with 
organized electricity markets to make available long-term firm transmission rights in 
accordance with the rule); FERC Order No. 679, 18 C.F.R. § 35, 116 FERC ¶ 61,057 (2006) 
(establishing incentive-based rate treatments for the transmission of electric energy in 
interstate commerce by public utilities for the purpose of benefiting consumers by ensuring 
reliability and reducing the cost of delivered power by reducing transmission congestion); 
FERC Order No. 890, 18 C.F.R. §§ 35, 37, 72 FERC ¶ 12,266 (2007) (amending the 
regulations and the pro forma open access transmission tariff to ensure that transmission 
services are provided on a basis that is just, reasonable, and not unduly discriminatory or 
preferential). 
63
 U.S. Energy Information Administration, Net Generation by State by Type of Producer 
by Energy Source (Annual Data 1990-2018) (Oct. 12, 2018), 
https://www.eia.gov/electricity/data/state/ [https://perma.cc/MC7K-FA2W].  
64
 Id.  
65
 U.S. Energy Information Administration, How Much Electricity Does an American Home 
Use? (Oct. 26, 2018), https://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.php?id=97&t=3 
[https://perma.cc/6GS4-5AQC] (“In 2018, the average annual electricity consumption for a 
U.S. residential utility customer was 10,972 kilowatt-hours (kWh), an average of about 914 
kWh per month.”). 
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illustrate the important role that independent power producers and 
wholesale power purchase contracts have played in the diversification of the 
American electricity industry and the development of renewable energy 
resources.66  
On the whole, independent power producers and wholesale power 
purchase contracts have become ubiquitous features of the American 
electric industry. Independent power producers are often smaller than 
traditional utilities, lightly regulated (at least relative to traditional utilities), 
and better able—or more willing—to accept market risk.67 It is likely that 
independent power producers and wholesale power purchase contracts will 
be an essential component of any state or traditional utility’s renewable 
energy strategy. Thus, an independent power producer may make an 
investment in a new solar or wind generation facility to support a traditional 
                                                                    
66
 Despite PURPA’s impact, the legislation faces criticism. Both industry groups, such as the 
Edison Electric Institute (EEI) and associations representing state regulators, like the 
National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners (NARUC), have urged Congress 
and FERC to adopt reforms that would make PURPA more compatible with modern, 
competitive energy markets. In particular, both groups have expressed concern that PURPA 
needlessly increases costs. For example, as a result of the avoided cost rate connection 
requirement, EEI reports “Pacificorp and Duke Energy customers are expected to pay $1.2 
billion and $1 billion, respectively, above market price for their energy” over the next decade. 
Iulia Gheorghiu, EEI Presses FERC for Faster, Streamlined PURPA Review, UTILITY DIVE 
(Feb. 6, 2019) https://www.utilitydive.com/news/eei-presses-ferc-for-faster-streamlined-
purpa-review/547741/ [https://perma.cc/SA3N-9FMJ]. In response, NARUC, and groups 
like it, have proposed that “regulations that move away from the use of administratively 
determined avoided costs to their measurement through competitive solicitations or market 
clearing prices.” Abby Harvey, NARUC Calls on FERC to Prioritize PURPA Reform, 
POWER MAGAZINE (Dec. 20, 2017) https://www.powermag.com/naruc-calls-on-ferc-to-
prioritize-purpa-reform/ [https://perma.cc/865Y-28Y8]. As this article was being written, 
FERC issued a notice of proposed rulemaking intended to modernize PURPA. Press 




 Ezra Hausman, Rick Hornby & Allison Smith, Bilateral Contracting in Deregulated 




(“A bilateral contract in an electricity market is an agreement between a willing buyer and a 
willing seller to exchange electricity, rights to generating capacity, or a related product under 
mutually agreeable terms for a specified period of time. Most economists agree that such 
arrangements are crucial to the functioning of electricity markets, because they allow both 
parties to have the price stability and certainty necessary to perform long-term planning and 
to make rational and socially optimal investments.”). 
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utility’s compliance with a state renewable energy mandate.68 In turn, the 
independent power producer relies on a long-term contract with the utility 
to recoup its investment over an extended term.69 However, these features, 
which make independent power producers more responsive to changing 
market and regulatory demands, place them at a greater risk of adverse 
financial consequences when a wholesale power purchase contract is 
rejected during a utility bankruptcy.70  
III. FILED RATE AND MOBILE-SIERRA DOCTRINES  
A. Filed Rate Doctrine 
Against this regulatory backdrop, utilities in the United States 
historically have operated as government-sanctioned monopolies; namely, 
in recognition that a single firm may be able to more efficiently allocate 
electric, gas, and telecommunication capital costs than a competitive 
market.71 In return for this monopoly power, utilities generally are subject to 
duties that firms engaged in market competition can avoid. Chief among 
                                                                    
68
 Id. at 11 (“Bilateral contracts are particularly important to the development of utility-scale 
renewable resources. These resources tend to be extremely capital intensive, and hence 
heavily weighted towards up-front costs, since they have no or limited fuel and emissions 
costs during their operating lives. The absence of fuel and emissions costs makes these 
resources particularly attractive for hedging future fuel and emissions price risks as part of a 
portfolio of resources to serve load. However, this avoided risk only benefits ratepayers if 
they are passed through—i.e., through long-term, fixed-price contracts. In many cases, 
approval of new environmentally attractive resources hinges on a contract structure that offers 
this benefit to ratepayers.”). 
69
 Id. at 12 (“Contracts of at least [five years] (and more likely ten years or more) are required 
to provide the level of revenue guarantee that developers need to finance new resources, 
which is one of the most important functions of these contracts.”). See also id. at 17 
(“Because most of the cost of renewables is up-front capital cost, renewable resources are 




 However, single firm control is not always a given, particularly in the context of generation 
and transmission.  See supra Section II.C. (discussing the development of independent 
power producers after the passage of Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978). 
Additionally, thirteen states have “deregulated” or restructured their energy markets to break 
previously vertically integrated utilities into their component parts. U.S. Energy Info. Admin, 
Electricity Residential Retail Choice Participation Has Declined Since 2014 Peak (Nov. 8, 
2018), https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=37452 [https://perma.cc/N2AN-
HFHB] (“Currently, 13 states and the District of Columbia have active, statewide residential 
retail choice programs . . . . Four other states—Michigan, Nevada, Oregon, and Virginia—
each have a form of limited retail choice that is mostly available to non-residential 
customers.”). 
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these responsibilities are the duties to serve and to set reasonable prices.72 
Accordingly, utilities typically must secure regulatory approval of their 
contracts, called tariffs, with retail customers and wholesale suppliers. Once 
the tariff is approved, utilities, customers, and suppliers must act consistently 
with it because deviations could unjustly benefit one party at the expense of 
another. 
The filed rate doctrine arises from this paradigm by “requir[ing] the 
courts to respect the public agency’s control over market prices and industry 
practices[.]”73 The file rate doctrine, thus, establishes a regulatory duty or 
obligation arising from the filed rate that is separate and superior to any 
private contractual duty.74 As a result, after the filed rate is approved, an 
aggrieved party’s primary remedy is any process provided by the 
administrative agency. While the filed rate doctrine was first employed in 
the context of the Interstate Commerce Act, which subjected railroads to 
federal regulation, it is now widely applied by state and federal agencies to 
regulated utilities.75 The Supreme Court has recognized FERC’s authority to 
employ the doctrine in the context of wholesale electricity contracts filed 
with the Commission under FPA section 201(b)(1) for more than sixty 
                                                                    
72
 See, e.g., Jim Rossi, The Common Law “Duty to Serve” and Protection of Consumers in 
an Age of Competitive Retail Public Utility Restructuring, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1233, 1236 
(1998) (“[P]ublic utilities are obligated—largely as conditions of their monopoly franchises—
to provide service to all customers within their service territories, sometimes even when the 
cost of providing service to a customer is in excess of the anticipated revenue from that 
customer.”). 
73
 Maislin Indus., U.S., Inc. v. Primary Steel, Inc., 497 U.S. 116, 144–45 (1990) (“[M]oreover, 
it significantly reduces the temptation of regulated parties to deviate from the market-wide 
rules formulated by the agency.”); Mississippi Power & Light Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Moore, 
487 U.S. 354, 375 (1988) (“The reasonableness of rates and agreements regulated by FERC 
may not be collaterally attacked in state or federal courts. The only appropriate forum for 
such a challenge is before the Commission or a court reviewing the Commission’s order.”); 
Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v. Hall, 453 U.S. 571, 577 (1981) (holding that the filed rate 
doctrine forbids a regulated entity from charging rates for its services other than those 
properly filed with the appropriate federal regulatory authority).  
74
 See, e.g., New York Cent. & Hudson River R.R. Co. v. York & Whitney Co., 256 U.S. 
406, 408 (1921) (“The transaction between the parties amounted to an assumption by the 
consignee to pay the only lawful rate it had the right to pay or the carrier the right to charge[:] 
[the rate filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission[.]”); Pennsylvania R.R. Co. v. 
International Coal Min. Co., 230 U.S. 184, 197 (1913) (“The tariff, so long as it was of force,” 
was “to be treated as though it had been a statute, binding as such upon railroad and shipper 
alike,” and “the shipper was . . . bound to pay and the carrier to retain what had been paid.”). 
75
 Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co., 453 U.S. at 577. (“The filed rate doctrine has its origins in 
this Court’s cases interpreting the Interstate Commerce Act . . . and has been extended across 
the spectrum of regulated utilities.”). 
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years.76 The Court has explained, consistent with other agency deference 
doctrines,77 “[t]he considerations underlying the [filed rate] doctrine . . . are 
preservation of the agency’s primary jurisdiction over reasonableness of 
rates and the need to insure that regulated companies charge only those 
rates of which the agency has been made cognizant.”78 
The meaning of “rate” in the filed rate doctrine is expansive. 
Wholesale power purchase contracts, which are the focus of this article, 
include a variety of terms not directly related to per unit costs, including 
facility siting and construction, delivery and interconnection arrangements, 
forced outages, capacity and service guarantees, third-party sales, and 
renewable energy credit ownership.79 Along these lines, the Supreme Court 
has made clear, “the filed rate doctrine is not limited to ‘rates’ per se[.]”80 
The Court subsequently reasoned, “[r]ates . . . do not exist in isolation. They 
have meaning only when one knows the services to which they are attached. 
Any claim for excessive rates can be couched as a claim for inadequate 
services and vice versa.”81 Thus, for wholesale power purchase contracts 
subject to FERC approval, the doctrine may provide an additional barrier 
to state regulatory interference, anti-trust claims, and challenges by 
contracting parties with regret or the benefit of hindsight. 
                                                                    
76
 16 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1) (2018); Montana-Dakota Util. Co. v. Nw. Pub. Serv. Co., 341 U.S. 
246, 251 (1951) (“[T]he right to a reasonable rate [under the Federal Power Act] is the right 
to the rate which the Commission files or fixes[.]”). 
77
 See, e.g., Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (holding agency 
interpretations should be upheld by the courts when a statute is ambiguous and the agency’s 
construction is permissible or reasonable); Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944) 
(holding a federal agency’s determination is entitled to judicial respect according to the 
interpretation’s persuasiveness). 
78
 Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co., 453 U.S. at 577–78. 
79
 See supra Section II.C., notes 54–55. Similarly, for retail customers, the filed rate, 
encompassed in the filed rate doctrine, often addresses matters such as service territory, 
technical terms and conditions, rules and regulations, consumer rights, cogeneration and 
distributed resources in addition to per unit price paid for natural gas or electricity. See, e.g., 




 Nantahala Power & Light Co. v. Thornburg, 476 U.S. 953, 966 (1986) (“‘[O]ur inquiry is 
not at an end because the orders do not deal in terms of prices or volumes of purchases.’”) 
(quoting N. Natural Gas Co. v. Kansas Corp. Comm’n, 372 U.S. 84, 90–91 (1963)); see 
Mississippi Power & Light Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Moore, 487 U.S. 354, 371 (1988) 
(“FERC’s exclusive jurisdiction applies not only to rates but also to power allocations that 
affect wholesale rates.”). 
81
 Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Cent. Off. Tel., 524 U.S. 214, 223 (1998). 
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B. Mobile-Sierra Doctrine 
Since its introduction, the filed rate doctrine has continued to evolve. 
The doctrine may even be applied when FERC does not specifically set or 
approve the rate. FERC and its predecessor, the Federal Power 
Commission, originally acted as a national government analog to state public 
utilities commissions by directly reviewing contracts to ensure compliance 
with the “just and reasonable” standard.82 Gradually, FERC has transitioned 
from direct regulation to ensuring adequate market competition. This trend 
has accelerated in the past few decades, coinciding with the passage of the 
Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act in 1978.83 The Supreme Court in 
FERC v. Electrical Power Supply Association explained: 
In this new world, FERC often forgoes the cost-based rate-setting 
traditionally used to prevent monopolistic pricing. The 
Commission instead undertakes to ensure “just and reasonable” 
wholesale rates by enhancing competition—attempting . . . “to 
break down regulatory and economic barriers that hinder a free 
market in wholesale electricity.”84 
The Mobile–Sierra doctrine, which has its genesis in two 1956 cases, 
helps accommodate this “new world.” In the first case, the Supreme Court 
considered whether a natural gas transmission company under a long-term 
contract with a distribution company could unilaterally “change the rate 
specified in the contract simply by filing a new rate schedule with the Federal 
Power Commission.”85 The Court ultimately held that because “the Natural 
Gas Act gives a natural gas company no power to change its contracts 
unilaterally, it follows that the new schedule . . . was a nullity insofar as it 
purported to change the rate set by its [original] contract . . . and that 
[original] contract rate remained the only lawful rate.”86  
The Court came to the same conclusion in the second case involving 
a contract with a fifteen-year term between Sierra Pacific Power Company 
and PG&E. When the parties entered the contract in 1948, PG&E provided 
Sierra with “a special low rate” in an attempt to secure the business. By 1953, 
                                                                    
82
 16 U.S.C. § 824e(a) (2018). 
83
 Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (PURPA), Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 
(1978) (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2645) (2018)); see supra Section II.C.  
84
 FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 760, 768 (2016) (quoting Morgan Stanley 
Capital Grp. Inc. v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 of Snohomish Cty., 554 U.S. 527, 536 (2008)). 
85
 United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Mobile Gas Serv. Corp., 350 U.S. 332, 333–34 (1956). It is 
important to note that in Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v. Hall, the Supreme Court recognized 
that the Federal Power Act and Natural Gas Act are “substantially identical” and subject to 
“interchangeabl[e]” precedent. 453 U.S. 571, 578 n.7 (1981). 
86
 United Gas Pipe Line Co., 350 U.S. at 347. 
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PG&E was no longer able to profitably provide electricity at this special rate. 
Like the transmission company in Mobile, PG&E unilaterally “filed with the 
Commission under § 205(d) of the Federal Power Act a schedule 
purporting to increase its rate to Sierra by approximately 28%.”87 Again, the 
Supreme Court rejected the attempt to revise the contract by invoking the 
Federal Power Commission’s responsibility to ensure “just and reasonable” 
rates. The Court explained:  
[T]he Commission holds that the contract rate is unreasonable 
solely because it yields less than a fair return on the net invested 
capital. But, while it may be that the Commission may not 
normally impose upon a public utility a rate which would produce 
less than a fair return, it does not follow that the public utility may 
not itself agree by contract to a rate affording less than a fair return 
or that, if it does so, it is entitled to be relieved of its improvident 
bargain.88 
Thus, the Mobile-Sierra doctrine, in many ways, is an extension of 
basic contract law principles: parties are only entitled to the value of the 
bargain they strike. Mobile-Sierra ensures that parties are not able to 
accomplish through an administrative process what they could not achieve 
through contract law. As the Court put it, “a contract may not be said to be 
either ‘unjust’ or ‘unreasonable’ simply because it is unprofitable to the 
public utility.”89 Instead, the Commission’s only duty in the case of an 
“improvident bargain” is to consider “whether the rate is so low as to 
adversely affect the public interest—as where it might impair the financial 
ability of the public utility to continue its service, cast upon other consumers 
an excessive burden, or be unduly discriminatory.”90 
In re Permian Basin Area Rate Cases later clarified that Mobile-Sierra 
creates a presumption that authorized wholesale rates are “just and 
reasonable” and that FERC may only abrogate such contracts “in 
circumstances of unequivocal public necessity.”91 More recently, Morgan 
Stanley Capital Group Inc. v. Public Utility District No. 1 of Snohomish 
County explained that setting aside a wholesale contract requires a finding 
of “‘unequivocal public necessity,’ or ‘extraordinary circumstances,’” 
regardless of whether the supplier or purchaser believes the rate is 
                                                                    
87
 Fed. Power Comm’n v. Sierra Pacific Power Co., 350 U.S. 348, 352 (1956). 
88
 Id. at 354–55. 
89
 Id. at 355. 
90
 Id.; see 16 U.S.C. § 824e(a) (2018).  
91
 In re Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 822 (1968). 
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excessive.92 Moreover, the Court has extended Mobile-Sierra to bar 
challenges by third parties to an approved rate.93  
 The ultimate effect of the Supreme Court’s FPA jurisprudence is to 
extend “FERC[’s] plenary authority over interstate wholesale rates” to 
matters well beyond the traditional conception of a rate as “[a] price fixed 
according to a ratio.”94 This is true even in cases where the Commission has 
limited its wholesale contract review to an evaluation of each party’s relative 
market power.95  
IV. FERC AND THE BANKRUPTCY COURTS  
During the 1990s and early 2000s, state legislatures and public utility 
commissions began to restructure retail electricity markets.96 Similarly, 
during the same time period, Congress and FERC began enacting reforms 
intended to increase market competition and reduce customer prices.97 The 
result of this activity was enhanced market volatility that, in some cases, 
resulted in bankruptcy.98 The following section discusses several 
jurisdictional disputes between FERC and bankruptcy courts arising out of 
these market changes. Most notably, this section discusses the Fifth Circuit 
Court of Appeals’ In re Mirant decision.99 
                                                                    
92
 Morgan Stanley Capital Grp. Inc. v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 of Snohomish Cty., 554 U.S. 
527, 550–51 (2008) (quoting In re Permian Basin, 390 U.S. at 822 (1968); Arkansas 
Louisiana Gas Co. v. Hall, 453 U.S. 571, 582 (1981)).  
93
 NRG Power Mktg., LLC v. Maine Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 558 U.S. 165, 168 (2010) (“The 
‘venerable Mobile–Sierra doctrine’ rests on ‘the stabilizing force of contracts.’ To retain 
vitality, the doctrine must control FERC itself, and, we hold, challenges to contract rates 
brought by noncontracting as well as contracting parties.”) (quoting Morgan Stanley Capital 
Grp. Inc., 554 U.S. at 548 (2008)); Nantahala Power & Light Co. v. Thornburg, 476 U.S. 
953, 953 (1986); New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1 (2002). 
94
 Rate, MERRIAM-WEBSTER (11th ed. 2003) (“[A] price fixed according to a ratio[.]”). 
95
 Thornburg, 476 U.S. at 953. 
96
 Katie Johnson, You Can’t Manage What You Can’t Measure: Exploring Restructuring’s 
Impact on Retail-Electric Markets, 38 VT. L. REV. 199, 202 (2013). 
97
 Id. at 202–04 (2013) (summarizing energy market restructuring legislation). 
98
 See In re Mirant, 378 F.3d 511, 516 (5th Cir. 2004). 
99
 Id. at 511. The most recent case addressing the intersection between the Bankruptcy Code 
and the Federal Power Act, prior to the PG&E bankruptcy, is In re FirstEnergy Solutions 
Corp. The FirstEnergy court relied largely on the reasoning from Mirant by concluding 
“cessation of performance, does not intrude on FERC’s jurisdiction over filed rates.” No. 18-
50757, 2018 WL 2315916 at *17 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio, May 18, 2018) (“If Plaintiffs were 
solvent and simply stopped making payments . . . the counterparties could not reasonably 
argue that [the debtors] had somehow modified or abrogated those agreements; they would 
seek damages for the breaches of those contracts . . . . Those breaches would lead to claims. 
If the Plaintiffs then filed bankruptcy, the claims would become claims against the estate. 
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A. Mirant’s Argument 
In 2004, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals was asked to consider 
whether the Mirant Corporation (Mirant), a competitive energy company, 
could reject a contract that it had previously entered into with Potomac 
Electric Power Company (Pepco) incident to a broader transaction to 
acquire Pepco’s electric generation facilities.100 The Mirant court ultimately 
relied on two related arguments. First, Mirant could reject the contract 
because it did not implicate the filed rate.101 Second, executory contract 
rejection in bankruptcy results in a breach of contract beyond FERC’s 
jurisdiction.102 Each of these arguments is discussed below.  
1. Mirant’s Consideration of the Filed Rate Doctrine 
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals first considered whether the FPA 
preempted rejection of the contracts due to FERC’s exclusive authority to 
determine wholesale rates.103 The court concluded, “the FPA does not 
preempt Mirant’s rejection of the [contract] because it would only have an 
indirect effect upon the file rate.”104 The court explained that FERC’s 
argument was “unpersuasive because it . . . does not challenge Mirant’s 
ability to breach the [contract] generally, nor does it challenge the 
calculation of damages from that breach.”105 In reaching this decision, the 
Mirant court relied on its Gulf States reasoning, where the debtor was 
allowed to seek damages based on certain provisions of a wholesale 
agreement related to “the amount purchased.”106 In Gulf States, the court 
repeatedly drew distinctions between rates, in the traditional sense,107 and 
other contract terms such as quantity.108 Similarly, the Mirant court 
explained, “courts are not preempted from awarding breach of contract 
damages based upon a theory that the breach increased the amount that was 
                                                                    
Treatment of those claims are governed by the Bankruptcy Code, including the confirmation 
of a reorganization plan . . . .”); see infra Section IV.B.1. 
100
 See In re Mirant, 378 F.3d at 511. Pepco was unable to assign all of its existing power 
purchase contracts associated with the generation facilities as part of the sale. Id. at 515. To 
resolve this issue, Pepco and Mirant entered into a “back-to-back” agreement where “Mirant 
agreed to purchase from Pepco an amount of electricity equal to Pepco’s obligation under 
those unassigned PPAs at the rates set in those contracts.” Id. 
101
 Id. at 518. 
102
 Id. at 525. 
103




 Id. at 521–22. 
106
 Gulf States Util. Co. v. Ala. Power Co., 824 F.2d 1465, 1471–72 (5th Cir. 1987). 
107
 Rate, MERRIAM-WEBSTER (11th ed. 2003) (“[A] fixed ratio between two things.”). 
108
 Gulf States Util. Co., 824 F.2d at 1471–72 
19
Dornfeld and Marsolek: A Kafkaesque Process? FERC Jurisdiction during Chapter 11 Bankrup
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2019
20 MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:1 
purchased, so long as damages are calculated using the filed rate.”109 With 
these distinctions drawn, the Fifth Circuit held that the non-debtor party, 
following the contract’s rejection, receives an “unsecured claim against the 
bankruptcy estate . . . based upon the amount of electricity it would have 
otherwise sold to Mirant under that agreement at the filed rate.”110  
2. Mirant’s “Rejection as Breach” Framework 
After deciding that damages based on the contemplated electricity 
purchases did not violate the filed rate doctrine, the Mirant court concluded 
that a rejected contract results in a breach of contract claim that is beyond 
FERC’s jurisdiction.111 This conclusion rests on a statutory interpretation of 
the Bankruptcy Code.112 The Code provides that a bankruptcy estate trustee 
(a debtor-in-possession) may, subject to the court’s approval, “assume or 
reject any executory contract.”113 Federal courts have explained that this 
provision “enable[s] ‘the trustee to maximize the value of the debtor’s estate 
by assuming executory contracts . . . that benefit the estate and rejecting 
those that do not.’”114 The rejection gives the non-breaching party a damages 
claim against the bankruptcy estate115 but does not terminate the parties’ 
rights under the contract.116  
The rejection-as-breach determination is supported by two bankruptcy 
law principles. First, the bankruptcy estate cannot possess any more rights 
                                                                    
109
 In re Mirant, 378 F.3d at 519. 
110
 In re Mirant, 378 F.3d at 520 (emphasis added).  
111
 Id. at 525 (stating that “FERC can only approve a change to a filed rate ‘if the rate is so low 
as to adversely affect interest’” and that the filed rate doctrine “does not allow FERC to 
change a filed rate based upon the purely private concern that the rate ‘is unprofitable to the 
public utility.’” (quoting Fed. Power Comm’n v. Sierra Pac. Power Co., 35 U.S. 348, 355 
(1956))). 
112
 In re Mirant, 378 F.3d at 519 (“Under the Bankruptcy Code . . . Mirant’s rejection of the 
Back-to-Back Agreement is a breach of contract.” (citing 11 U.S.C § 365(g))). 
113
 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (2018). A contract is executory when “performance remains due to 
some extent on both sides.” Mission Prod. Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology, LLC, 139 S. Ct. 
1652, 1658 (2019) (quoting N.L.R.B. v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 522 n.6 (1984)). 
The Bankruptcy Code’s plain terms specify that the rejection of an executory contract 
constitutes a breach of contract. 11 U.S.C. § 365(g) (2018); see Mission Prod., 139 S. Ct. at 
1658. 
114
 Cinicola v. Scharffenberger, 248 F.3d 110, 119–20 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting L.R.S.C. Co. 
v. Rickel Home Ctr., 209 F.3d 291, 298 (3d Cir. 2000)). 
115
 See Mission Prod., 139 S. Ct. at 1658; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 236 
cmt. a (1981). 
116
 See Mission Prod., 139 S. Ct. at 1661 (“Rejection of a contract—any contract—in 
bankruptcy operates not as a rescission but as a breach.”). 
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than the debtor itself had outside of bankruptcy.117 Second, terms undefined 
in the Bankruptcy Code retain the definitions that are established at 
common law.118 In this instance, the term “breach of contract” in section 
365(g), as incorporated by section 365(a), has a well-established meaning at 
common law: “When performance of a duty under a contract is due any 
non-performance is a breach.”119 In addition, under the common law, a total 
breach occurs when the breach “discharges the injured party’s remaining 
duties to render such performance.”120 Repudiation, similar to non-
performance, also is generally considered a total breach.121 A total breach 
gives the non-breaching party a claim for damages.122 It also paves the way 
for the non-breaching party to choose whether to continue to perform or to 
refuse to perform further.123 Consistent with these provisions, Mirant 
explained that the Bankruptcy Code “permit[s] a business to reorganize 
instead of liquidating [thus] . . . allow[ing] it to ‘continue to provide jobs, to 
satisfy creditors’ claims, and to produce a return for its owners.”124  
Mirant’s embrace of the Bankruptcy Code makes its statutory analysis 
relatively straightforward. First, the Fifth Circuit recognized that rejection 
under Bankruptcy Code section 365 constitutes a breach of contract that 
transforms the non-breaching party into an unsecured creditor with a pre-
petition claim against the estate.125 The Fifth Circuit’s decision is supported 
                                                                    
117
 Id. at 1663 (citing Bd. of Trade of Chic. v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 1, 14 (1924)); 11 U.S.C. § 
541(a)). 
118
 Mission Prod., 139 S. Ct. at 1662 (citing Field v. Mans, 516 U.S. 59, 69 (1995)); see also, 
e.g., Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 322–23 (1992) (articulating the well-
established principle that where Congress uses terms that have accumulated a settled 
meaning under the common law, courts must infer that Congress intended to incorporate 
that settled common law understanding).  
119
 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 235. 
120
 Id. §§ 235, 243(1). 
121
 See id. § 253. 
122
 See infra note 125.  
123
 See Mission Prod., 139 S. Ct. at 1662 (citing 13 RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON 
CONTRACTS § 39:32 (4th ed. 2013) (footnote omitted)). 
124
 In re Mirant, 378 F.3d 511, 517 (5th Cir. 2004) (quoting United States v. Whiting Pools, 
Inc., 462 U.S. 198, 203 (1983)). 
125
 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (2018) (“[T]he trustee, subject to the court’s approval, may assume or 
reject any executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor.”); 11 U.S.C. § 365(g) (2018) 
(“[T]he rejection of an executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor constitutes a 
breach of such contract[.]”); see, e.g., Mission Prod., 139 S. Ct. at 1658; In re Murphy, 694 
F.2d 172, 174 (8th Cir. 1982) (“[R]ejection of an executory contract in accordance with 
applicable provisions of the Bankruptcy Act is not the equivalent of rescission . . . . 
[R]ejection constitutes a breach of contract, and a person injured thereby is deemed a 
creditor and is entitled to assert a claim for damages.”); In re Lavigne, 114 F.3d 379, 386–87 
(2d Cir. 1997) (“While rejection is treated as a breach, it does not completely terminate the 
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by bankruptcy case law, which provides that parties are generally left with 
the rights and remedies available outside of bankruptcy law following 
rejection.126 To that end, federal courts elsewhere have explained, “rejection 
operates as a breach of an existing and continuing legal obligation of the 
debtor, not as a discharge or extinction of the obligation itself.”127 
Second, the Fifth Circuit concluded that FERC jurisdiction does not 
extend to common law breach of contract claims arising from wholesale 
power purchase contracts subject to FPA regulation.128 Indeed, FERC itself 
has held that energy contract sales disputes “negotiated [at] market-based 
rates are more appropriately resolved in court or by arbitration.”129  
State courts also have successfully asserted jurisdiction over FPA 
related contracts. For example, in Airco Alloys Div., Airco, Inc. v. Niagara 
Mohawk Power Corp.,  a group of industrial customers alleged that Niagara 
Mohawk breached its contract with the Power Authority of the State of New 
York (Power Authority).130 The contract was mandated by an order pursuant 
to the Federal Power Act that directed the Power Authority to make low-
cost hydropower available to Niagara Mohawk.131 In return, Niagara 
                                                                    
contract.”); Pub. Serv. Co. of N.H. v. N.H. Elec. Coop., Inc., 884 F.2d 11, 15 (1st Cir. 1989) 
(The Code “afford[s] breathing space to decide which contracts [debtors] wish to assume [or 
reject].”). 
126
 Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979) (“Property interests are created and 
defined by state law.”); see also Clean Burn Fuels, LLC v. Purdue BioEnergy, LLC, 492 B.R. 
445, 457 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 2013) (“When hearing a case under diversity jurisdiction, federal 
courts apply the law of the forum state . . . . Thus, ‘in the absence of a compelling federal 
interest which dictates otherwise, [state law applies] where a federal bankruptcy court seeks 
to determine the extent of a debtor’s property interest.’”) (quoting In re Merritt Dredging 
Co., 839 F.2d 2013, 206 (4th Cir. 1988)); Michael T. Andrew, Executory Contracts in 
Bankruptcy: Understanding “Rejection”, 59 U. COLO. L. REV. 845, 848, 863, 888 (1988) 
(explaining that rejection excludes that property and those substantive rights from the 
bankruptcy estate). 
127
 In re Modern Textile, Inc., 900 F.2d 1184, 1191 (8th Cir. 1990); see also In re Midwest 
Polychem, Ltd., 61 B.R. 559, 563 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. June 9, 1986) (“Rejection of the contract 
constitutes a breach and the injured party is entitled to assert a claim for damages.”); see also 
In re Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc., 131 B.R. 808, 812 (S.D. Ohio 1991) (“[I]t is not true that 
solvent debtors may petition for bankruptcy and then obtain a windfall by rejecting their 
executory contracts . . . . Such a view ignores the fact that in the event of liquidation the party 
whose contract is rejected must have his claim satisfied before the debtor may obtain 
recovery.”) (quoting In re Chi-Feng Huang, 23 B.R. 798, 803 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1982) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
128
 In re Mirant, 378 F.3d 511, 521–22 (5th Cir. 2004). 
129
 PPL Mont., LLC, 96 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,313, 62,208 (2001). 
130
 Airco Alloys Div., Airco, Inc. v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 65 A.D.2d 378, 381 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 1978). 
131
 Id.  
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Mohawk was required to sell this power to a class of industrial customers.132 
In response to a defense raised by Niagara Mohawk and the Power 
Authority that the court lacked jurisdiction to hear the claims, a New York 
intermediate appellate court concluded that it retained jurisdiction because 
“traditional common-law claims do not lose their character because it is 
common knowledge that there exists a related, and perhaps relevant, 
scheme of federal regulation.”133 
Likewise, in KN Energy, Inc. v. Great Western Sugar Co., Colorado 
state courts resolved allegations that a natural gas supplier had breached a 
FERC jurisdictional contract with a customer by unilaterally “changing the 
standard under which it determined when to interrupt delivery.”134 There, 
the Great Western Sugar Company ultimately was awarded damages arising 
from the breach of the parties’ service agreement without involvement of 
FERC, despite KN Energy’s argument that the change was mandated by 
FERC.135  
Similarly, in Hartman v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., the New Mexico 
Supreme Court held that neither the Natural Gas Act nor the Natural Gas 
Policy Act precluded a state court from deciding contractual issues involving 
gas purchase contracts, which were regulated tangentially and peripherally 
by federal statutes.136  
Finally, in Cleveland v. Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co., the Ohio 
Court of Appeals cited FERC for the proposition that “[t]he Commission 
has no special expertise in applying relevant contract law to divine the intent 
of the contracting parties as to the degree of firmness contemplated in their 
contract” for the purposes of contract interpretation.137 Cases like these likely 
                                                                    
132
 Id. at 383. 
133
 Id. at 384 (citing Pan American Corp. v. Superior Court of Delaware, 366 U.S. 656, 663 
(1961)). In addition, the New York court concluded that “[e]qually well established is the 
principle that exclusive jurisdiction provisions do not divest the state courts of the power to 
decide questions arising under the laws of the United States, but only ‘cases’ arising under 
those laws.” Id. at 383–84 (citing Pratt v. Paris Gas Light & Coke Co., 168 U.S. 255, 259 
(1897)). 
134
 698 P.2d 769, 775 (Colo. 1985). 
135
 Id. at 775, 781. 
136
 107 N.M. 679, 684 (1988). 
137
 684 N.E.2d 343, 349 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996) (quoting Puget Sound Power & Light Co., 74 
F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,192, 61,659 (1996)) (internal citation marks omitted)). See also Ne. Rural Elec. 
Membership Corp. v. Wabash Valley Power Ass’n, 56 N.E.3d 38, 44 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) 
(holding that a claim for breach of contract for generation and transmission of electricity 
accrued at time that cooperative submitted to jurisdiction of Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission); Pogo Producing Co. v. Sea Robin Pipeline Co, 493 So. 2d 909 (La. Ct. App.), 
writ denied, 497 So. 2d 310 (La. 1986) (granting a preliminary injunction in favor of producer 
to enforce specific performance against pipeline arising out of six gas purchase contracts); 
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allowed the Mirant court to conclude it was on firm ground when it 
determined that both the Bankruptcy Code and FERC appear to funnel 
traditional common law contract claims—like breach—to the courts.  
The third and final step for the Fifth Circuit was to characterize 
Mirant’s rejection as a traditional breach of contract that transformed the 
other party, Pepco, into an unsecured creditor. To that end, the Fifth 
Circuit’s conclusion, “Mirant may choose to reject this agreement as 
unnecessary to its reorganized business because it represents excess capacity 
in its system to supply electricity” reasonably follows from this Bankruptcy 
Code interpretation.138 
B. Mirant is Unpersuasive 
Ultimately, Mirant’s arguments should be unpersuasive to other 
courts. Mirant appears to rest on a filed rate doctrine misreading and an 
expansive view of the Bankruptcy Code that eliminates any possibility for 
continuing FERC jurisdiction over wholesale power purchase contracts. 
Both of these issues are addressed below. 
1. Mirant Drew Improper Distinctions Between the Contract 
Terms 
Mirant relied, in part, on a distinction between the “rate” in a 
traditional sense and the other contractual terms.139 This distinction appears 
impermissible in light of a trio of Supreme Court cases suggesting that the 
filed rate requires courts to consider all of the contract provisions instead of 
the interplay between the price and quantity terms.  
First, Northern Natural Gas Co. v. Kansas Corp. Commission 
considered whether the Kansas State Corporation Commission could 
require an interstate pipeline company to purchase gas from all wells 
connecting with its pipeline system without encroaching upon the exclusive 
                                                                    
RJB Gas Pipeline Co. v. Colo. Interstate Gas Co., 813 P.2d 1, 5–6 (Okla. Civ. App. 1989) 
(holding that there was no usurpation of Federal Energy Regulatory Commission’s 
jurisdiction when a state court resolved a natural gas seller’s claim against the buyer for 
amounts allegedly due under the contract for the sale of interstate gas); Doswell Ltd. P’ship 
v. Va. Elec. & Power Co., 468 S.E.2d 84 (Va. 1996) (exercising jurisdiction in an action 
brought by independent power producer against electric utility for breach of power purchase 
agreement). 
138
 In re Mirant, 378 F.3d 511, 520 (5th Cir. 2004). 
139
 Id. at 515 (“While the FPA does not preempt breach of contract claims that challenge a 
filed rate, district courts are permitted to grant relief in situations where the breach of contract 
claim is based upon another rationale.”). 
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regulatory jurisdiction of the Federal Power Commission.140 There, the 
Court held that the filed rate doctrine applied even though “the orders do 
not deal in terms of prices or volumes of purchases[.]”141 The Court 
explained that the Natural Gas Act leaves no room for direct or indirect 
regulation of interstate wholesale contracts because it “directly affect[s] the 
ability of the Federal Power Commission to regulate comprehensively and 
effectively the transportation and sale of natural gas, and to achieve the 
uniformity of regulation.”142  
Second, Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v. Hall evaluated whether the 
filed rate doctrine barred a state court from calculating damages in a breach-
of-contract action based on an assumption that FERC would have approved 
a different rate had it known about material facts that were withheld.143 The 
basic issue was a contract provision that required the Arkansas Louisiana 
Gas Company to pay the same rate for gas from the Sligo Gas Field as it was 
paying a different supplier. Eventually, the respondents—natural gas 
producers—discovered they were being paid less than the other supplier and 
sought contract damages in Louisiana state court based on the clause. The 
Louisiana Supreme Court upheld the damages award.144 However, the U.S. 
Supreme Court reversed that decision, concluding, “[i]t would undermine 
the congressional scheme of uniform rate regulation to allow a state court to 
award as damages a rate never filed with the Commission” even when the 
provision entitling that party to damages was included in the previously 
approved contract.145 The Court’s decision was buttressed by the filed rate 
doctrine’s fundamental purpose of “granting the Commission an 
opportunity in every case to judge the reasonableness of the rate.”146 
Third, AT&T v. Central Office Telephone explained that “[r]ates . . . 
do not exist in isolation.”147 Instead, “[t]hey have meaning only when one 
knows the services to which they are attached.”148  
The upshot of these cases is that FERC is obligated to exercise 
oversight over changes to jurisdictional contracts because of its comparative 
competence, the desire for uniform decision making, and the regulatory 
obligation created by the filed rate. For the contracts themselves, these cases 
suggest that FERC jurisdictional contracts should be treated holistically and 
                                                                    
140
 372 U.S. 84, 85–86 (1963). 
141
 Id. at 90–91. 
142
 Id. at 91–92. 
143
 453 U.S. 571, 573 (1981).  
144
 Id. at 574–76.  
145
 Id. at 579.  
146
 Id. at 582.  
147
 524 U.S. 214, 223 (1998). 
148
 Id. at 223. 
25
Dornfeld and Marsolek: A Kafkaesque Process? FERC Jurisdiction during Chapter 11 Bankrup
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2019
26 MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:1 
that attempts to isolate price and quantity terms are likely inconsistent with 
the filed rate doctrine and the FPA.149 Indeed, even the Arkansas Louisiana 
Gas Co. attempt to award damages for failing to comply with a FERC 
approved equal payment contract provision was deemed a violation.150 
Accordingly, FERC unsuccessfully argued in Mirant: 
FERC’s reasonableness calculus [under 16 U.S.C. § 824d(a)] 
included a factor that the parties would honor all their obligations 
throughout the duration of the applicable contractual term. 
Mirant’s proposed rejection would remove that factor from the 
calculus. Without FERC review and approval, Mirant would be 
able to retain . . . [those] benefits . . . without the corresponding . . 
. obligations[.]151  
FERC found a more sympathetic court for this argument two years 
later. In In re Calpine, a debtor “filed a motion in the Bankruptcy Court for 
entry of an order authorizing debtors to reject certain energy contracts” 
because the “electricity prices fixed in the [power agreements] are 
significantly lower than prevailing electricity prices.”152 For its part, the district 
court recognized “FERC’s jurisdiction and the filed rate doctrine stretches 
past regulation of rates . . . and extends to the terms and conditions of 
wholesale energy contracts.”153 Moreover, “[a] change to the duration of a 
filed rate energy contract, would also come under FERC’s jurisdiction.”154 
Thus, the court explained: 
                                                                    
149
 Central Office Telephone is a case adjudicating an issue under the Telecommunications 
Act. Nevertheless, filed rate doctrine analysis remains similar under the acts governing FCC 
and FERC jurisdiction. See id. at 221–22; Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467, 
477–89 (2002) (tracing the history of tariffs and the filed rate doctrines back to the Interstate 
Commerce Commission).  
150
 Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co., 453 U.S. at 579. 
151
 Br. of Appellee FERC at 36, In re Mirant, 378 F.3d 511 (5th Cir. 2004); see also Federal 
Power Act, § 205, 16 U.S.C. § 824d(a) (2012) (requiring “[a]ll rates and charges made, 
demanded, or received . . . in connection with the transmission or sale of electric energy 
subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission . . . be just and reasonable.”). 
152
 337 B.R. 27, 30–31 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
153
 Id. at 32. 
154
 Id. at 33 (citing In re Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 822 (1968) (“The 
regulatory system created by the Act is premised on contractual agreements voluntarily 
devised by the regulated companies; it contemplates abrogation of these agreements only in 
circumstances of unequivocal public necessity.”)); see Pennsylvania Water & Power Co. v. 
Fed. Power Comm’n, 343 U.S. 414, 423 (1952) (holding that if an energy supplier “wishes 
to discontinue some or all of the services [the FPA] has rendered for the past twenty years, 
the Act . . . opens up a way provided [the supplier] can prove that its wishes are consistent 
with the public interest.”). 
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The [a]greements that Calpine seeks to reject have been filed with 
FERC and, under normal conditions, altering the rates, terms, 
conditions, or duration of the contracts would require FERC 
involvement and approval. A solvent company could not choose 
to stop performance and expect anything other than swift FERC 
action. There are no provisions in the FPA that specifically limit 
FERC jurisdiction in the bankruptcy context.155 
Finally, the district court explained the Code’s structure itself allows a 
regulatory agency to exercise its authority during “the pendency of a 
reorganization.”156  
Notably, unlike in Mirant, the Calpine court chose to avoid wading too 
deeply into the “rejection as a breach” versus “rejection as a modification 
subject to FERC approval” issue on which the Mirant decision ultimately 
turned.157 Instead, the court characterized the rejection as a “unilateral 
termination” subject to FERC jurisdiction.158 In this way, the Calpine court 
allowed the filed rate doctrine to extend fully into the bankruptcy context. 
First, Calpine recognized, unlike the Mirant court, that the filed rate means 
the entire contract including the regulatory obligation created by FERC 
approval of the original commercial agreement. Second, Calpine reasoned 
that Congress intended for the Bankruptcy Code to accommodate actions 
by regulatory agencies pursuant to section 1129(a)(6). 
Similarly, In re Boston Generating considered FERC jurisdiction’s 
effect on the bankruptcy court.159 In that case, the debtor sought to reject a 
contract for natural gas transportation via a third-party pipeline to one of its 
power plants.160 Separately, the debtor sought FERC approval to sell the 
power plant as part of its bankruptcy reorganization.161 At issue was not 
whether FERC had jurisdiction, but the order in which the FERC and the 
bankruptcy court could exercise it. Both parties agreed, “FERC must make 
                                                                    
155
 In re Calpine, 337 B.R. at 33. 
156
 Id. at 35 (“The Bankruptcy Code itself supports this conclusion by contemplating agency 
action during the pendency of a reorganization.”) (citing 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4); 11 U.S.C. § 
1129(a)(6)). 
157
 Id. at 36 (“Because there is nothing in the Bankruptcy Code that limits FERC’s jurisdiction, 
Calpine cannot achieve in Bankruptcy Court what neither it, nor any other party in this case, 
nor any other federally regulated energy company in the country could do without seeking 
FERC approval: cease performance under the rates, terms, and conditions of filed rate 




 No. 10 Civ. 6528 DLC, 2010 WL 4616243 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 12, 2010). 
160
 Id. at *1.  
161
 Id. at *2. 
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the public interest determination” before the contract could be rejected.162 
In its decision, the district court acknowledged that under the filed rate 
doctrine, “[o]nce filed with FERC, wholesale power contracts become the 
‘equivalent of a federal regulation.’”163 The district court reasoned, 
“[w]hether the bankruptcy court and FERC review the proposed rejection 
concurrently or serially is of no consequence. If either the bankruptcy court 
or FERC does not approve the Debtors’ rejection of the [pipeline service 
agreement], the Debtors may not reject the contract.”164 Calpine and Boston 
Generating, thus, demonstrate that the filed rate doctrine can accommodate 
both FERC and bankruptcy jurisdiction. 
2. Rejection Marks a “Radical Departure” from Traditional 
Contract Law 
In addition to misreading the filed rate doctrine, the Fifth Circuit relied 
on an expansive “rejection as a breach” argument to support its conclusion 
that Mirant could reject undesirable contracts without FERC review.165 This 
position is made untenable by bankruptcy’s “radical departure” from 
traditional contract law. Rejection encompasses powers that are not 
coextensive with common law contracts.166 Professor Michael T. Andrew, in 
his leading article on the subject, explains: 
Courts describe the “power” to reject as permitting such things as 
the release, repeal, reconsideration, discharge, revocation, 
repudiation, alteration, voiding, cancellation or avoidance of 
contract or lease obligations . . . . Courts frequently use the vehicle 
of rejection to terminate rights in or to property that are otherwise 
good in bankruptcy. All of this suggests a radical departure from 
normal contract law.167 
Rejection flows from the fact that the debtor and the bankruptcy estate 
are distinct legal entities.168 This difference plays a role in determining which 




 In re Boston Generating, LLC, Nos. 10 Civ. 6528 DLC, 10 Civ. 7208 DLC, 2010 WL 
4288171, at *4. (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 1, 2010). 
164
 In re Boston Generating, LLC, No. 10 Civ. 6528 DLC, 2010 WL 4616243, at *3 
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 12, 2010).  
165
 In re Mirant, 378 F.3d 511, 522 (5th Cir. 2004). 
166
 See Michael T. Andrew, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Understanding “Rejection”, 
59 U. COLO. L. REV. 845, 847–48 (1988).  
167
 Andrew, supra note 166, at 847–48. 
168
 Hall v. United States, 566 U.S. 506, 512 (2012) (differentiating between the debtor and 
the estate when determining the dischargeability of certain taxes); Andrew, supra note 166, 
at 851–52. 
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party is liable for the breach. Unlike a traditional contract obligor, the 
bankruptcy estate is not bound under the contract unless the trustee elects 
to assume it.169 Because the debtor and the estate are two separate entities, 
bankruptcy differentiates between the debtor’s obligations and the estate’s 
obligations.170 As a general rule, claims that arise pre-petition are the debtor’s 
obligations, while claims that arise post-petition belong to the estate.171 Since 
the rejection of the contract in bankruptcy is based on the legal fiction that 
the contract is considered rejected at the time the debtor files bankruptcy, 
rejection creates a pre-petition obligation of the debtor, not a post-petition 
obligation of the estate.172 In the event that the bankruptcy trustee does not 
assume the contract, the non-breaching party does not obtain a claim against 
the bankruptcy estate, but rather an unsecured claim against the debtor.173 
This distinction is not an academic curiosity. The differing obligations of 
the debtor and estate create different rights and remedies based on those 
different claims, which have real world consequences for creditors.174   
Unlike in a traditional contract breach, equitable relief is only allowed 
when “such breach gives rise to a right to payment.”175 In other words, 
specific performance is not an available remedy in bankruptcy, despite 
being an option in a garden-variety breach of contract action.176 To that end, 
                                                                    
169
 See id. at 877–78; see also id. at 866 (“‘Rejection,’ at least in the context of the basic 
assume-or-reject election, is nothing more than the label for the election not to assume a 
contract.”). 
170
 See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 502, 503, and 507 (2018).  
171
 See 11 U.S.C. § 503 (allowing administrative expenses against the estate after the filing of 
the bankruptcy petition).  
172
 See 11 U.S.C. § 502(g).  
173
 See 11 U.S.C. § 507; Mission Prod. Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology, LLC, 139 S. Ct. 1652, 
1658 (2019) (citing NLRB v. Bildisco and Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 531–32 (1984); cf. In re 
Res. Tech. Corp., 662 F.3d 472, 476 (7th Cir. 2011). The practical implication is that the 
non-breaching party will struggle to recover more than a few cents on every dollar when 
attempting to recover from a bankrupt debtor stripped of his or her assets which are now 
held separately in the bankruptcy estate. See Mission Prod., 139 S. Ct. at 1658 (citation 
omitted). 
174
 See 11 U.S.C. § 507(a) (describing the priority of claims and expenses against the 
bankruptcy estate); Mission Prod., 139 S. Ct. at 1658 (citation omitted). 
175
 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(B) (2018); see, e.g., In re Nickels Midway Pier, LLC, 255 Fed. Appx. 
633, 637–38 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting In re Ben Franklin Hotel Assocs., 186 F.3d 301, 305–
06 (3d Cir. 1999)), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 812 (2008).  
176
 As mentioned, the provisions of the bankruptcy code allow equitable claims that give rise 
to a right of repayment. The bankruptcy discharge and plan confirmation provisions provide, 
respectively, for an injunction precluding the filing of any action on a claim that has been 
discharged and acting as res judicata on any claim that could have been brought. See, e.g., In 
re Ben Franklin Hotel Assocs., 186 F.3d 301, 304 (3d Cir. 1999). Nevertheless, when an 
equitable claim does not give rise to a right of repayment as a viable alternative, then some 
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the Calpine court recognized, “[i]t is of no moment that rejection in the 
bankruptcy court constitutes a breach . . . . [A] ‘breach’ here does not create 
a typical dispute over the terms of a contract, but the unilateral termination 
of a regulatory obligation.”177 
During the 2018–2019 term, the Supreme Court shed new light on 
bankruptcy rejection. Mission Product Holdings Inc. v. Tempnology 
considered whether contract rejection during a Chapter 11 bankruptcy 
proceeding results in a breach of contract or has “the effect of a contract 
rescission in the non-bankruptcy world.”178 The Court held that rejection 
results in a breach of contract that provides the aggrieved, non-breaching 
party a pre-petition claim for damages.179 Although Mission Product 
Holdings adopted the rejection-as-a-breach framework, the Court explained 
that “[t]he Code of course aims to make reorganizations possible. But it 
does not permit anything and everything that might advance that goal.”180 To 
that end, Mission Product Holdings provides that rejection “does not grant 
the debtor an exemption from all the burdens that generally applicable law 
. . . imposes on private owners.”181 Instead, “Whatever ‘limitation[s] on the 
debtor’s property [apply] outside of bankruptcy[] appl[y] inside of 
bankruptcy as well. A debtor’s property does not shrink by happenstance of 
bankruptcy, but it does not expand, either.’”182 
Elsewhere, executory contracts similarly have been described “as an 
asset coupled with a liability—the asset being the performance due the 
debtor and the liability being the obligation owed by the debtor.”183 Professor 
Andrew has written, “The debtor’s obligations are unaffected, and provide 
                                                                    
courts construe the claim to fall outside of bankruptcy entirely, and an action may be 
maintained under state law. See Crafts v. Pitts, 162 P.3d 382, 387–89 (Wash. 2007); see also 
In re Udell, 18 F.3d 403, 406–08 (7th Cir. 1994).  
177
 In re Calpine Corp., 337 B.R. 27, 36 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
178
 Mission Prod., 139 S. Ct. at 1661. 
179
 Id. at 1661–63. 
180
 Id. at 1665. Likewise, the Court has “rejected the notion that ‘Congress had a single 
purpose in enacting Chapter 11.’” Florida Dep’t of Revenue v. Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc., 
554 U.S. 33, 51 (2008) (quoting Toibb v. Radloff, 501 U.S. 157, 163 (1991)). 
181
 Id. at 1665. 
182
 Mission Prod., 139 S. Ct. at 1663 (quoting D. BAIRD, ELEMENTS OF BANKRUPTCY, 97 
(6th ed. 2014)). See also Board of Trade v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 1, 11 (1924) (holding that a 
validly transferred property interest prior to the bankruptcy enters the bankruptcy estate 
subject to that interest). 
183
 Christopher W. Frost, Running the Asylum: Governance Problems in Bankruptcy 
Reorganizations, 34 ARIZ. L. REV. 89, 99 (1992) (citing DOUGLAS G. BAIRD & THOMAS H. 
JACKSON, CASES, PROBLEMS, AND MATERIALS ON BANKRUPTCY 234 (2d ed. 1990)). 
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the basis for a claim.”184 Courts have construed the term “obligation” 
broadly—consistent with its common meaning—as “[t]hat which a person is 
bound to do or forebear; any duty imposed by law, promise, contract, 
relations of society, courtesy, kindness, etc.”185 These explanations suggest 
that limitations on a debtor, such as the counterparty’s license or lease of 
the debtor’s property, persist following a rejection. 
In the FERC context, wholesale power purchase contracts are 
authorized and subject to ongoing regulatory oversight. FERC’s continuing 
jurisdiction over these contracts amounts to a limitation on the parties’ rights 
to freely assign or modify their agreement. The failure of courts, such as in 
Mirant, to distinguish between the parties’ commercial transaction and the 
ongoing regulatory obligation created by FERC’s approval of that 
transaction has at least two problems. First, the filed rate doctrine 
commands that the regulatory obligation arising from the filed rate is 
separate and superior to any private contractual duty.186 To that end, any 
regulatory obligation owed to FERC is independent of the executory 
contract and, thus, is beyond the bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction. Second, 
even if the regulatory obligation was not separate from the underlying 
commercial transaction, allowing debtors to reject their regulatory 
obligations during bankruptcy would impermissibly expand their rights by 
providing a benefit that would not be available outside of bankruptcy; 
namely, the option to jettison an otherwise valid and ongoing duty.187 In this 
way, disposal of a regulatory obligation incident to executory contract 
rejection is both inconsistent with FERC’s jurisdiction and the fact that “‘[a] 
debtor’s property . . . does not expand’” during bankruptcy.188 Though, to 
be clear, the regulatory obligation’s independent nature is sufficient to 
resolve this issue in light of FERC’s exclusive jurisdiction, as discussed 
immediately below.189  
                                                                    
184
 Andrew, supra note 166, at 931; see also In re Lavigne, 114 F.3d 379, 386–87 (2nd Cir. 
1997) (“While rejection is treated as a breach, it does not completely terminate the contract 
. . . . Thus, ‘[r]ejection merely frees the estate from the obligation to perform; it does not 
make the contract disappear.’”) (quoting In re The Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, 138 
B.R. 687, 703 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992)). 
185
 In re Montgomery Ward Holding Corp., 268 F.3d 205, 209 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 968–69 (5th ed. 1979)). 
186
 See supra notes 73 – 76. 
187
 In re Calpine Corp., 337 B.R. 27, 36 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
188
 Mission Prod., 139 S. Ct. at 1663 (quoting D. BAIRD, ELEMENTS OF BANKRUPTCY, 97 
(6th ed. 2014)).  
189
 Infra Part V. 
31
Dornfeld and Marsolek: A Kafkaesque Process? FERC Jurisdiction during Chapter 11 Bankrup
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2019
32 MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:1 
V. FERC’S EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION  
This section explains why jurisdictional disputes between FERC and 
bankruptcy courts should be resolved by affirming FERC’s exclusive 
authority under the FPA over filed rates. It further explains why the 
Supreme Court’s frequently cited Bildisco and NextWave holdings provide 
limited guidance.190 This section finally argues that Congress should consider 
enacting a legislative solution to the extent that courts do not allow FERC to 
exercise exclusive jurisdiction over wholesale power purchase contracts in 
the bankruptcy context.  
A. Exclusive Jurisdiction 
1. The Federal Power Act Demands Exclusive Jurisdiction  
FERC’s own view of its jurisdiction relative to the bankruptcy courts 
has evolved. The Commission first took the position that it had exclusive 
jurisdiction over wholesale power purchase contracts.191 After Mirant, FERC 
concluded that the Fifth Circuit’s holding was the applicable standard for 
the Calpine case.192 Following the decisions in Calpine and Boston 
Generating, FERC initially took the position that it had concurrent 
jurisdiction over PG&E’s bankruptcy.193 On appeal to the Ninth Circuit, 
FERC came full circle by asserting that it retains exclusive regulatory 
jurisdiction over filed contracts.194  
The PG&E bankruptcy court expressed vehement opposition to 
FERC’s concurrent jurisdiction approach.195 The court concluded that it 
would be unfair and vitiate the bankrupt party’s rights:  
Parties not in bankruptcy are subjected to an involuntary process 
by their opponents before a non-judicial, administrative body. Just 
a few days later they are told by that body that if they file 
bankruptcy, one of the basic and critically important tools . . . will 
be unavailable. And if they don’t like it, they’ll have to appeal via 
                                                                    
190
 FCC v. NextWave, 537 U.S. 293 (2003); NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513 
(1984). 
191
 Br. of Appellee FERC at 8–11, In re Mirant, (No. 04-10001), 2004 WL 2682161.  
192
 In re Calpine Corp., 337 B.R. at 31. 
193
 NextEra Energy, Inc. v. Pac. Gas and Elec. Co., 167 FERC ¶ 61,096 (2019) (Nos. EL19-
35-001, EL19-36-001), 2019 WL 2026800, at *1. 
194
 Br. for Appellant FERC at 38, In re PG&E Corp., Nos. 19-16833, 19-16834 (9th Cir. Nov. 
20, 2019) (“The Federal Power Act gives the Commission exclusive authority to regulate the 
sale of [electric] energy at wholesale in interstate commerce[.]” (citing 16 U.S.C. §§ 824(a), 
824d(a))).  
195
 NextEra Energy, Inc., 2019 WL 2026800, at *4. 
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a procedure outside of the bankruptcy system with its exclusive 
subject-matter jurisdiction.  
One day later they file bankruptcy, where myriad rights and duties (and 
obligations) come into play and a bankruptcy court, experienced in 
bankruptcy matters, is there to preside. Now that bankruptcy is a reality and 
not an intention, the agency repeats its prior ruling, that it has concurrent 
jurisdiction with the bankruptcy court, but that court will not be available to 
vindicate one of their fundamental and critical bankruptcy rights.196 
Although the bankruptcy court appropriately recognized the 
“absurdity” of this process,197 the court erred in its conclusion that the 
bankruptcy court retains exclusive jurisdiction. To the contrary, FERC 
should exercise exclusive jurisdiction over the parties’ wholesale power 
purchase contracts because the filed rate creates an ongoing regulatory 
obligation for the debtor governed by the FPA.  
Although the contract and regulatory obligation tend to operate 
coterminously, once a contract is approved by FERC, the parties’ 
obligations emanate from the rate filed with FERC, not their underlying 
commercial transaction.
198
 These filed rates carry the force and effect of 
law.199 Upon approval, they become the “equivalent of a federal regulation,”200 
and the duty to perform under those contracts arises, “not from the law of 
private contracts,” but FERC itself.201 In addition to creating the parties’ 
obligations, the doctrine creates “an independent regulatory duty [for 
                                                                    
196
 In re PG&E Corp., 603 B.R. 471, 484–85 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2019). 
197
 Id. at 484.  
198
 See Pennsylvania Water & Power Co. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 343 U.S. 414, 422 (1952); 
In re Calpine Corp., 337 B.R. 27, 37 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); cf. Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 
78 n.4 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting) (“If you think you can think about a thing that is hitched 
to other things without thinking about the things that it is hitched to, then you have a legal 
mind.” (quotation mark omitted)). 
199
 See infra note 233; see also Nw. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Montana-Dakota Utils. Co., 181 F.2d 
19, 22 (8th Cir. 1950) (Filed rates are “treated as though it were a statute, binding upon the 
seller and the purchaser alike.” (citations omitted)); cf. Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 
281, 295 (1979) (“It has been established in a variety of contexts that properly promulgated, 
substantive agency regulations have the ‘force and effect of law.’” (footnote omitted)). 
200
 California ex rel. Lockyer v. Dynegy, Inc., 375 F.3d 831, 839 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting 
Cahnmann v. Sprint Corp., 133 F.3d 484, 488 (7th Cir. 1998)). 
201
 Pennsylvania Water & Power Co., 343 U.S. at 422; see also Blumenthal v. NRG Power 
Mktg., Inc., 104 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,211, 61,743 (2003) (“[T]he commission exercised . . . its 
authority under the FPA, which is independent of authority arising from the contract.”); cf. 
Noble Energy, Inc. v. Jewell, 110 F.Supp.3d 5 (D.D.C. 2015) (concluding that discharging a 
party’s contractual obligations did not also free them from obligations arising from an 
overlapping regulation), aff’d, 650 Fed.Appx. 9 (2016).  
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FERC] to remedy a utility’s violation of its filed rate schedule.”202 As a result, 
FERC has plenary jurisdiction over the filed rates, meaning the entire 
agreement, not just the per-unit cost of electricity. 
Considering FERC’s expansive authority, the concurrent jurisdiction 
argument, as the PG&E bankruptcy court identified, leads to inefficient 
results. Even if the debtor first obtains bankruptcy court approval to reject 
the wholesale contract, the debtor must still obtain FERC approval to 
modify the filed rate because the filed rate ultimately controls the debtor’s 
regulatory obligations.
203
 On the other hand, if the debtor first obtains FERC 
approval for the desired modification or cancellation, then the need to 
obtain bankruptcy court approval for a rejection of the contract is obviated.204 
Finally, if FERC enforces the existing rate, then the bankruptcy court still 
cannot approve a contract rejection because the controlling filed rate 
remains the law that the parties must follow.
205
  
As a policy matter, FERC should retain exclusive jurisdiction over the 
wholesale energy market. In other contexts, neither state206 nor privately-
enforced laws207 can interfere with FERC’s ability to set and control 
wholesale energy rates. FERC’s exclusivity allows regulated entities to order 
their affairs around it, which may reduce marketplace uncertainty.208 
Allowing a regulated entity to reject a wholesale power purchase contract in 
bankruptcy court could upset this delicate balance. Finally, FERC is better-
                                                                    
202
 Duke Power Co. v. FERC, 864 F.2d 823, 829 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (“[T]he enforcement of 
filed rate schedules is a matter distinctly within the Commission’s statutory mandate[.]”) 
203
 See Pennsylvania Water & Power Co., 343 U.S. at 422; In re Calpine Corp., 337 B.R. at 
37.  
204
 16 U.S.C. § 824d(d) (2018) (“Unless the Commission otherwise orders, no change shall 
be made by any public utility in any such rate, charge, classification, or service, or in any rule, 
regulation, or contract relating thereto, except after sixty days’ notice to the Commission and 
to the public.”);  16 U.S.C. § 824e(a) (2018) (granting FERC authority to revise contracts 
“[w]henever the Commission . . . [finds] that any rate . . . or contract affecting such rate . . . 
is unjust, unreasonable, unduly discriminatory or preferential[.]”). 
205
 See Pennsylvania Water & Power Co., 343 U.S. at 422; In re Calpine Corp., 337 B.R. 27, 
37 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
206
 See, e.g., FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 760, 782 (2016) (“We will not 
read the FPA, against its clear terms, to halt a practice that so evidently enables the 
Commission to fulfill its statutory duties of holding down prices and enhancing reliability in 
the wholesale energy market.”).  
207
 See generally Sandeep Vaheesan, Market Power in Power Markets: The Filed-Rate 
Doctrine and Competition in Electricity, 43 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM, 921, 923 (2013) 
(“Several circuits have invoked the filed-rate doctrine . . . to immunize power generators from 
private suits under the Sherman Act.”). 
208
 NRG Power Mktg., LLC v. Maine Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 558 U.S. 165, 174 (2010) 
(“Competitive power markets simply cannot attract the capital needed to build adequate 
generating infrastructure without regulatory certainty.”). 
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suited with its agency expertise to understand whether “extraordinary 
circumstances” exist that justify modification or cancellation of a filed tariff 
under FPA section 206.209 For these reasons, the logical and efficient solution 
is to require the parties to seek a modification (i.e., termination) of the tariff 
through a petition to FERC.
210
 
  2. Bankruptcy Code Section 1129(a)(6) Accommodates FERC 
As a textual matter, the Bankruptcy Code expressly contemplates the 
interplay between bankruptcy courts and administrative agencies. Section 
1129(a)(6) accounts for governmental regulatory commissions like FERC 
with rate oversight: “Any governmental regulatory commission with 
jurisdiction, after confirmation of the plan, over the rates of the debtor has 
approved any rate change provided for in the plan, or such rate change is 
expressly conditioned on such approval.”211 Unfortunately, Congress 
appears to have provided little insight into the meaning of “rate” in section 
1129(a)(6). The relevant legislative history simply, and somewhat self-
evidently, explains that the section “permits confirmation only if any 
regulatory commission that will have jurisdiction over the debtor after 
confirmation of the plan has approved any rate change provided for in the 
plan. As an alternative, the rate change may be conditioned on such 
approval.”212 
Statutory interpretation principles are more instructive. As a general 
matter, statutes should be read harmoniously such that competing texts are 
made compatible.213 Moreover, “where Congress borrows terms of art . . . 
which are accumulated [in] the legal tradition . . . it presumably knows and 
                                                                    
209
 16 U.S.C. § 824e(a) (2018) (directing the Commission to “determine the just and 
reasonable rate . . . and shall fix the same by order.”). 
210
 See 16 U.S.C. § 824d(d) (2018) (“Unless the Commission otherwise orders, no change 
shall be made by any public utility in any such rate, charge, classification, or service, or in any 
rule, regulation, or contract relating thereto, except after sixty days’ notice to the Commission 
and to the public.”); 16 U.S.C. § 824e(a) (2018) (granting FERC authority to revise contracts 
“[w]henever the Commission . . . [finds] that any rate . . . or contract affecting such rate . . . 
is unjust, unreasonable, unduly discriminatory or preferential[.]”). 
211
 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(6) (2018). In addition, bankruptcy courts cannot use the automatic 
stay to enjoin agency enforcement proceedings. 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4) (2018); Bd. of 
Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys. v. MCorp Fin., Inc., 502 U.S. 32, 39–40 (1991). 
212
 H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 412 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6368; S. REP. 
NO. 95-989, at 126 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5912 (using identical 
language as the House Report).  
213
 THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH 
REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 58 (1868) 
(“[O]ne part is not to be allowed to defeat another, if by any reasonable construction the two 
can be made to stand together.”). 
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adopts the cluster of ideas that were attached to each borrowed word.”214 
Finally, “when ‘judicial interpretations have settled the meaning of an 
existing statutory provision, repetition of the same language in a new statute’ 
is presumed to incorporate that interpretation.”215 Although not dispositive, 
these canons suggest that to the extent the filed rate doctrine was part of the 
legal landscape at the time section 1129(a)(6) was enacted and it promotes 
harmony between the Federal Power Act and the Bankruptcy Code, it is 
reasonable to interpret section 1129(a)(6)’s “rate” term as co-extensive with 
the filed rate doctrine.  
Several factors suggest Congress anticipated, or reasonably should have 
anticipated, that FERC’s broad authority arising from the FPA and filed rate 
doctrine would be imputed into section 1129(a)(6). First, the filed rate 
doctrine is widely applied by administrative agencies in the context of 
pervasively regulated industries such as electric and gas utilities, railroads, 
and telecommunications.216 This history should support a finding that the 
doctrine is part of “the accumulated legal tradition.”217 Likewise, the 
doctrine’s long history supports an inference that Congress borrowed, or 
expected courts to borrow, its definition of “rate” in the regulatory context. 
Second, Congress was likely aware of the interplay between the doctrine and 
the rejection of executory contracts during bankruptcy. The Bankruptcy 
Code has allowed the rejection of executory contracts that are “onerous” or 
“burdensome” to the estate of the debtor since the 1890s.218 Third, by its 
very terms, section 1129(a)(6) assumes that a “regulatory commission” with 
rate regulatory authority will be involved in the reorganization process by 
exercising its normal authority. Since section 1129(a)(6) expressly grants 
authority to regulatory agencies, it suggests that Congress was aware that 
regulatory agencies would be involved in the reorganization process. It also 
                                                                    
214
 See, e.g., Morissette v. U.S., 342 U.S. 246, 263 (1952); see also ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN 
A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 53 (2012). 
215
 Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Center, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1378, 1386 (2015) (quoting 
Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 645 (1998)).  
216
 See supra note 149. 
217
 Supra Section III.A.; see also Keogh v. Chicago & Northwestern Railway Co., 260 U.S. 
156, 163 (1922) (“The legal rights of shipper as against carrier in respect to a rate are 
measured by the published tariff . . . . The rights as defined by the tariff cannot be varied or 
enlarged by either contract or tort of the carrier.”).  
218
 In re Midwest Polychem, Ltd., 61 B.R. 559, 562 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1986). Though, it is 
possible Congress did not anticipate that utility bankruptcies would become more common. 
Indraneel Sur, Jealous Guardians In The Psychedelic Kingdom: Federal Regulation of 
Electricity Contracts In Bankruptcy, 152 PENN. L. REV. 1697, 1718 (2004) (“Given that utility 
bankruptcies in significant numbers are only a product of the last decade, it may be that when 
enacting the FPA, Congress did not anticipate the peculiar executory contract rejection that 
would apply.”). 
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suggests Congress intended regulatory agencies to apply their respective 
bodies of law and did not want bankruptcy courts unilaterally supplanting 
agency authority. 
Finally, other statutory interpretation principles may further support 
distinguishing between regulatory obligations arising from FERC 
jurisdictional contracts and the remainder of the bankruptcy estate. 
“Indeed, ‘when two statutes are capable of coexistence, it is the duty of the 
courts, absent a clearly expressed congressional intention to the contrary, to 
regard each as effective.’”219 In addition to allowing both the FPA and the 
Bankruptcy Code to coexist, this division of labor—leaving wholesale power 
purchase contracts to FERC and everything else to the bankruptcy court—
may be more consistent with Congress’ intentions when it established a 
specialized commission for interstate energy contracts and specialized 
courts to address bankruptcy cases.  
B. NextWave and Bildisco 
An additional consideration is the effect of several Supreme Court 
bankruptcy cases cited by courts in decisions resolving conflicts between 
FERC and the bankruptcy courts. For reasons discussed in detail below—
relating primarily to differences in the jurisdictional grants of authority given 
to each agency—these cases provide only limited guidance in the wholesale 
energy market context.  
In NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, a building supply company, Bildisco, 
filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy.220 As part of its reorganization, Bildisco 
rejected the collective-bargaining agreement with its employees. The union 
representing the employees protested with the National Labor Relations 
Board (NLRB).221 The NLRB concluded that Bildisco had violated the 
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) by unilaterally changing the 
collective-bargaining agreement terms and by refusing to negotiate with the 
union. The Court held, pursuant to Bankruptcy Code section 365(a), that 
Bildisco could reject the union contract.222 It reasoned, “Congress knew how 
to draft an exclusion for collective-bargaining agreements when it wanted 
to.”223 Thus, in the absence of any such exception, the company could reject, 
like any other contract, the bargaining agreement.  
                                                                    
219
 J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 143–44 (2001) 
(quoting Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551 (1974)). 
220
 465 U.S. 513, 517 (1984). 
221
 Id. at 518. 
222
 Id. at 518–19. 
223
 Id. at 522–23. 
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Later in FCC v. NextWave, the Federal Communications Commission 
(FCC) auctioned off certain broadband communications licenses to 
NextWave Personal Communications (NextWave).224 “NextWave made a 
downpayment on the purchase price, signed promissory notes for the 
balance, and executed security agreements that the FCC perfected by filing 
under the Uniform Commercial Code.”225 NextWave was unable to obtain 
financing and missed its first payment deadline. The FCC, in turn, canceled 
the contract and made NextWave’s licenses available for auction. The 
Supreme Court was asked to consider whether the FCC could simply cancel 
contracts with auction winners that went bankrupt instead of exercising its 
rights under the contract.226 The Court explained, the FCC’s desire to “(1) 
sell[] licenses on credit and (2) cancel[] licenses rather than assert[] security 
interests in licenses when there is a default” amounts “to nothing more than 
a policy preference.”227 Although the FCC had a “regulatory motive,” it 
ultimately was acting as an unsecured creditor—not a third-party regulator. 
The Court concluded that the FCC was bound by the terms of its contract 
and could not attempt to avoid the bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction over 
NextWave’s bankruptcy estate.228  
Although Bildisco and NextWave both addressed disputes between 
bankruptcy courts and federal agencies, there is a crucial difference between 
the agencies implicated in those cases and FERC. The NLRB and FCC do 
not approve contracts carrying the force of law. The NLRA provides the 
NLRB authority to regulate labor contract disputes affecting interstate 
commerce.229 The NLRB neither approves the contracts themselves nor 
exercises exclusive jurisdiction over all employers, employees, or labor 
disputes.230 To that end, the Calpine court reasoned, the NLRB “does not 
possess exclusive jurisdiction over the terms of collective bargaining 
agreements, thus, in Bildisco, there was no jurisdictional conflict.”231 The 
                                                                    
224
 537 U.S. 293 (2003). 
225
 Id. at 296–97. 
226
 Id. at 301 (“The FCC has not denied that the proximate cause for its cancellation of the 
licenses was NextWave’s failure to make the payments that were due. It contends, however, 
that § 525 does not apply because the FCC had a ‘valid regulatory motive’ for the 
cancellation.”). 
227
 Id. at 304. 
228
 Id. at 307 
229
 See generally National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2017) (declaring a policy of 
encouraging and protecting the free flow of commerce).  
230
 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2017) (defining employee rights protected under the NLRA); 29 U.S.C. 
§ 158 (2017) (establishing violations of the NLRA); 29 U.S.C. § 152(7) (2017) (providing the 
NLRA’s definition of “affecting commerce”); 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (2017) (providing NLRB 
authority to investigate and resolve questions about union representation). 
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 In re Calpine Corp., 337 B.R. 27, 34 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
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Supreme Court has further explained, “The [NLRB’s authority] to deal with 
an unfair labor practice . . . is not exclusive and does not destroy the 
jurisdiction of the courts.”232 Likewise, Textile Workers Union of America 
v. Lincoln Mills of Alabama concluded that the NLRA merely created a 
new area of substantive federal law for the courts to interpret.233 In this way, 
neither the NLRB nor the NLRA purports to exercise exclusive control 
over labor agreements. Likewise, the FCC does not approve spectrum 
contracts; it is a party to them by entering into agreements with spectrum 
auction winners. To that end, the FCC’s failure to exercise its contractual 
rights was the basis of the Court’s NextWave decision. Though the Court 
discussed bankruptcy jurisdiction exceptions, NextWave ultimately stands 
for the proposition that a government agency has no more rights as a 
creditor than a private party.234 
Unlike the NLRB and the FCC, FERC aims to exercise plenary and 
exclusive authority over wholesale power purchase contracts. Courts, 
including the Supreme Court, have held, “[o]nce filed with a federal agency, 
such tariffs are the ‘equivalent of a federal regulation.’”235 In 2016, Hughes 
v. Talen Marketing affirmed FERC’s “plenary authority over interstate 
wholesale rates.”236 Hughes involved a state’s decision to construct a new 
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 Smith v. Evening News Ass’n, 371 U.S. 195, 197 (1962). 
233
 353 U.S. 448, 456 (1957) (“We conclude that the substantive law to apply in suits under § 
301(a) is federal law, which the courts must fashion from the policy of our national labor 
laws.”); accord Cynthia A. Bailey, A Federal Subject Matter Jurisdiction Under § 301(a) of 
the Labor Management Relations Act: Wooddell v. International Brotherhood of Electrical 
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 NextWave, 537 U.S. at 307 (“It is neither clear that a private party can take and enforce a 
security interest in an FCC license, nor that the FCC cannot . . . . As we described in our 
statement of facts, the FCC purported to take such a security interest in the present cases. 
What is at issue, however, is not the enforcement of that interest in the bankruptcy process, 
but rather elimination of the licenses through the regulatory step of ‘revoking’ them . . . .”) 
(internal citations omitted). 
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 Cal. ex rel. Lockyer v. Dynegy, Inc., 375 F.3d 831, 839 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Cahnmann 
v. Sprint Corp., 133 F.3d 484, 488 (7th Cir. 1998); see Evanns v. AT&T Corp., 229 F.3d 
837, 840 & n.9 (9th Cir. 2000)); see also Lowden v. Simonds-Shields-Lonsdale Grain Co., 
306 U.S. 516, 520–21 (1939) (holding “tariffs bind both carriers and shippers with the force 
of law. Under § 6 of the Interstate Commerce Act the carrier cannot deviate from the rate 
specified in the tariff for any service in connection with the transportation of property.”). 
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 136 S. Ct. 1288, 1298 (2016). In Hughes, electricity regulators in Maryland were 
concerned about sufficient electric generation capacity, and further that the market price 
generated at the RTO capacity auctions would not spur the necessary development. Id. at 
1294. In response, Maryland directly solicited bids for a new gas-fired power plant that would 
not be part of the RTO market. Id. Maryland then promulgated a state regulation that would 
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power plant, which is notable because such decisions traditionally belong to 
states and are beyond FERC’s purview. Yet, the Supreme Court concluded 
FERC had jurisdiction because the law would have resulted in indirect 
subsidization by interstate market participants.237 In these ways, courts have 
read FPA section 824(b)(1), which grants FERC exclusive jurisdiction over 
“the sale of electric energy at wholesale in interstate commerce,” more 
broadly than the NLRA or the Communications Act of 1934. Thus, in 
contrast to NLRB and FCC cases, Calpine concluded: 
There are no provisions in the FPA that specifically limit FERC 
jurisdiction in the bankruptcy context. Quite the contrary, FERC, 
in its charge to maintain reasonable rates and uphold the public 
interest, must also consider the financial ability of a utility to 
continue service under a filed rate, a responsibility that would 
include similar considerations to those in the bankruptcy court.238 
In light of the differences between the FPA and other federal 
regulatory statutes, the reliance of the Mirant court—and more recently, the 
PG&E bankruptcy court—on the NextWave and Bildisco decisions is 
misplaced.  
C. A Congressional Fix 
Finally, if courts fail to find that FERC may exercise exclusive 
jurisdiction over wholesale power purchase contracts in the bankruptcy 
context, Congress should consider enacting a legislative solution to ensure 
FERC’s authority over the regulatory obligation created by the filed rate. In 
2005, Congress enacted reforms to clarify FERC’s role in regulating energy 
derivatives following a dispute between FERC and the Commodity Futures 
Trading Commission (CFTC).239 In that instance, Congress “expanded 
FERC’s jurisdiction to include jurisdiction over manipulation in connection 
with the purchase or sale of electric energy or transmission services and the 
                                                                    
require other producers participating in the RTO market to buy electricity from the new 
power plant and pay the new power plant the difference between the capacity auction price 
and the new plant’s set contract price. Id. at 1294–95. 
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 Id. at 1294.  
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 In re Calpine Corp., 337 B.R. 27, 34 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); see Fed. Power Comm’n v. Sierra 
Pac. Power Co., 350 U.S. 348, 355 (1956). 
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 Energy Policy Act of 2005, 16 U.S.C. § 824v(a) (2018) (“It shall be unlawful for any entity 
. . . to use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of electric energy . . . subject 
to the jurisdiction of the Commission, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance . 
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necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of electric ratepayers.”). 
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purchase or sale of natural gas or transportation services.”240 The CFTC, in 
turn, retained jurisdiction over energy derivatives.241 Likewise, following 
Bildisco, Congress enacted legislation “to clarify the relationship between 
the debtor in possession and its unionized employees.”242  
Although the Federal Power Act and existing case law should provide 
a sufficient basis for exclusive FERC jurisdiction, Congress could act to 
revise or expand sections 1113 through 1116 of the Bankruptcy Code to 
account for wholesale power purchase contracts in addition to existing 
accommodations for collective bargaining agreements, retiree insurance 
benefits, estate property, and small businesses. Alternatively, or in 
conjunction with Bankruptcy Code reforms, Congress could revise FPA 
section 201 to affirm FERC’s primacy over these agreements. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Avoiding a “Kafkaesque” process to resolve jurisdictional disputes 
between FERC and the bankruptcy courts is an important goal.243 The most 
appropriate solution is to grant FERC exclusive authority over wholesale 
power purchase contracts. This approach is supported by statute and case 
law. The Federal Power Act, and the cases interpreting it, extend FERC’s 
jurisdiction beyond the “Attleboro gap” and grant the agency more authority 
over regulated entities than the NLRB and FCC in their respective realms. 
Allowing a debtor to reject its FERC jurisdictional contract gives that party 
the option to unilaterally do what it could not achieve in any other context: 
alter the terms of a filed rate without FERC approval.244  
Moreover, the filed rate doctrine’s application in combination with a 
bankruptcy proceeding contract rejection ultimately would be futile. Even if 
the bankruptcy court allowed the rejection, the parties would still be subject 
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to their FERC regulatory obligations because the filed rate is not a run-of-
the-mill contract; rather, it is equivalent to a federal regulation.245 Finally, 
perhaps to the PG&E bankruptcy court’s chagrin, bankruptcy courts are not 
vested with the power to review the propriety of a FERC action.246 
Exclusive jurisdiction also supports the Federal Power Act’s underlying 
policy goals: more consistent decision-making, the application of specialized 
expertise, and greater regulatory certainty. Importantly, all is not lost for a 
financially distressed utility or independent power producer. Although a 
party may not escape an “improvident bargain,” FERC still may set aside a 
wholesale power purchase contract when “‘unequivocal public necessity’ or 
‘extraordinary circumstances’” require it.247  
Lastly, in addition to other climate change mitigation strategies,248 FERC 
oversight results in more efficient industry management as markets 
experiment and adopt alternative energy technologies. Firms may be more 
willing to invest in emerging technologies—such as wind, solar, and battery 
storage—when they have the certainty provided by a filed rate. Put simply, 
we think affirming FERC’s exclusive authority is the “answer” that helps 
facilitate continued emerging energy technology development and keeps 
market participants from “blowin’ in the wind” of jurisdictional 
uncertainty.249 
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